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NOTES 
Fifth Amendment Privilege for Producing Corporate Documents 
In Fisher v. United States, 1 the Supreme Court held that an indi-
vidual may assert his fifth amendment privilege against compelled self-
incrimination2 if his production of personal documents pursuant to a 
subpoena involves incriminating testimonial admissions.3 The Court 
extended this act-of-production privilege to a sole proprietor required 
by subpoena to produce proprietorship records in United States v. 
Doe. 4 In cases decided before Fisher, the Court had consistently pro-
hibited a person from asserting his personal fifth amendment privilege 
in order to avoid producing corporate5 documents that he held in a 
representative capacity.6 Lower courts7 and commentators disagree as 
to whether Fisher and Doe changed this established rule and extended 
1. 425 U.S. 391 (1976). 
2. U.S. CoNsr. amend. V ("No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself .... "). 
3. 425 U.S. at 408-10. 
4. 465 U.S. 605, 612-14 (1984). 
5. This Note uses the terms "corporate" and "corporation" interchangeably with the term 
"entity" to refer to any organization such as a corporation, professional corporation, single 
stockholder corporation, unincorporated association, or partnership that the Court has held is 
not entitled to the protection of the fifth amendment. See notes 28-33 infra and accompanying 
text. 
6. See notes 20-33 infra and accompanying text. For detailed definitions of "corporate" pa-
pers and "personal" versus "representative capacity" see, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings 
(Shiffman), 576 F.2d 703 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 830 (1978); In re Grand Jury Investi-
gation, Special Grand Jury No. II, Sept. Term, 1983, 600 F. Supp. 436, 438 (D. Md. 1984). 
7. For post-Fisher cases holding that the act-of-production privilege is not available to per-
sons compelled to produce corporate documents see United States v. Vallance, 793 F.2d 1003, 
1005-06 (9th Cir. 1986); In re Grand Jury Subpoena (85-W-71-5), 784 F.2d 857, 861 (8th Cir.), 
cert. granted sub nom. See v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 59 (1986); In re Grand Jury Proceedings 
(Morganstem), 771 F.2d 143, 147 (6th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 594(1985);111 re 
Grand Jury Subpoena (Lincoln), 767 F.2d 1130, 1131 (5th Cir. 1985); Butcher v. Bailey, 753 
F.2d 465, 471 n.9 (6th Cir.) (dicta), cert. dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 17 (1985); In re Kave, 760 F.2d 
343, 357 n.30 (1st Cir. 1985); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Vargas), 727 F.2d 941, 946 (10th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 90 (1984); United States v. Malis, 737 F.2d 1511, 1512 (9th Cir. 
1984); In re Grand Jury Empanelled Mar. 8, 1983, 722 F.2d 294, 296-97 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. 
dismissed, 465 U.S. 1085 (1984); United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1044 (5th Cir. 1981) 
{dicta), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 862 (1982); United States v. MacKey, 647 F.2d 898, 900 (9th Cir. 
1981) (Kennedy, J., concurring); United States v. Popkin, 623 F.2d 108, 110 (9th Cir. 1980); 111 
re Grand Jury Proceedings (United States), 626 F.2d 1051, 1053 (1st Cir. 1980); In re Grand 
Jury Empanelled Feb. 14, 1978 (Markowitz), 603 F.2d 469, 476 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v. 
Hankins, 565 F.2d 1344, 1349 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 909 (1979); United States v. 
Kretz Equip. Co., 56 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 85-5135 (N.D. Ind. 1985); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas 
Served Feb. 27, 1984, 599 F. Supp. 1006, 1012 (E.D. Wash. 1984); In re Heuwetter, 584 F. Supp. 
119, 122-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Apache Corp. v. McKeen, 529 F. Supp. 459, 462-63 (W.D.N.Y. 
1982); Pratt v. Kirkpatrick, 718 P.2d 962, 967-68 (Alaska 1986); People v. Superior Court 
(Ebel), 39 Cal. 3d 740, 742-43, 705 P.2d 347, 349-50, 218 Cal. Rptr. 24, 26-27 (1985); 111 re 
1544 
June 1986] Note - Corporate Document Production 1545 
the act-of-production privilege to a person compelled to produce cor-
porate documents. 8 
Several courts of appeals have recently addressed this issue and 
have reached conflicting results. The Third Circuit in In re Grand 
Jury Matter (Brown), 9 held that the act-of-production privilege may be 
available to all persons compelled to produce records, regardless of the 
nature of the records compelled.10 Since Brown, the Second and 
Fourth Circuits have acknowledged that the privilege may be available 
to persons subpoenaed for corporate documents. I I In contrast, the 
Sixth and Eighth Circuits have held that the Fisher-Doe analysis does 
not displace the traditional fifth amendment doctrine that precluded 
self-incrimination claims for individuals required to produce corporate 
records.I2 
Rubin, 100 A.D.2d 850, 474 N.Y.S.2d 94 (App. Div. 1984); Minnesota State Bar Assn. v. Di-
vorce Assistance Assn., 311 Minn. 276, 278-79, 248 N.W.2d 733, 737-38 (1976). 
For cases holding that the act-of-production privilege is available to persons subpoenaed to 
produce corporate documents, see note 11 infra; United States v. Sancetta, 788 F.2d 67, 74-75 
(2d Cir. 1986); In re Grand Jury Matter (Brown), 768 F.2d 525, 528-29 (3d Cir. 1985) (en bane); 
United States v. Barth, 745 F.2d 184, 189 (2d Cir. 1984) (dicta), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1356 
(1985); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated June 13, 1983 and June 22, 1983, 722 
F.2d 981, 986-87 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Darwin Constr. Co., 632 F. Supp. 1426, 1429 
(D. Md. 1986) (assuming "arguendo" that act-of-production privilege applies); In re Grand Jury 
83-8 (MIA) Subpoena Duces Tecum, 611 F. Supp. 16, 23-24 (S.D. Fla. 1985); In re Grand Jury 
Investigation, Special Grand Jury No. II, Sept. Term, 1983, 600 F. Supp. 436, 438 (D. Md. 1984) 
(dicta); State v. Wellington Precious Metals, Inc., 487 So. 2d 326, 327-28 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1986); In re Benkins Record Storage Co., 62 N.Y.2d 324, 328-30, 465 N.E.2d 345, 347-48, 476 
N.Y.S.2d 806, 808-09 (1984) (dicta). See also In re Siegel, 208 N.J. Super. 588, 592, 506 A.2d 
776, 778 (1986) (acknowledging split of authority). 
8. Compare Note, Organizational Papers and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 99 
HARV. L. R.Ev. 640 (1986) [hereinafter cited as Note, Organizational Papers], and Note, Sole 
Shareholder's Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Producing Corporate Documents, 59 TEMP. 
L. Q. 219 (1986) [hereinafter cited as Note, Sole Shareholder's Privilege], and Comment, United 
States v. Doe and its Progeny: A Reevaluation of the Fifth Amendment's Application to Custodi-
ans of Corporate Records, 40 U. MIAMI L. R.Ev. 793 (1986), with Note, Fifth Amendment Privi-
leges and Compelled Production of Corporate Papers After Fisher and Doe, 54 FORDHAM L. R.Ev. 
935 (1986) [hereinafter cited as Note, Privilege After Fisher and Doe]. 
9. 768 F.2d 525 (3d Cir. 1985) (en bane). 
10. 768 F.2d at 528. 
11. United States v. Lang, 792 F.2d 1235, 1240-41 (4th Cir. 1986); In re Two Grand Jury 
Subpoenae Duces Tecum, 769 F.2d 52, 57 (2d Cir. 1985); see also In re Grand Jury Subpoenas 
Issued to 13 Corps., 775 F.2d 43, 46 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1459 (1986) (an 
exception to rule that a corporate representative acting in representative capacity cannot claim 
privilege against production of records exists "when an individual is personally compelled to 
produce and authenticate corporate records and those acts are self-incriminating"). 
12. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena (85-W-71-5), 784 F.2d 857, 861 (8th Cir.), cert. granted 
sub nom. See v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 59 (1986); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Morgan-
stem), 771 F.2d 143, 147 (6th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 594 (1985). The court in 
Morganstern stated: 
The appellants contend that Doe extended to the custodian of corporate and partnership 
records the same right to refuse to produce those records as an individual has with respect to 
personal records. We do not read Doe so expansively .... [N]othing in the Doe decision ... 
supports an inference that the collective entity rule, developed by the Supreme Court over a 
period of nearly 80 years, was overruled sub silentio. 
771 F.2d at 147; see also note 112 infra and accompanying text. 
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This Note argues that a person should be able to assert her fifth 
amendment privilege against self-incrimination when her act of pro-
ducing corporate documents pursuant to a subpoena 13 causes her to 
make testimonial admissions that are incriminating. Part I briefly ex-
amines the two approaches the Supreme Court has used to decide 
claims of self-incrimination for records production. First, it explains 
the Court's traditional entity doctrine which, by focusing on the na-
ture of the documents and the capacity in which they are held, has 
prohibited records producers from invoking the fifth amendment priv-
ilege against self-incrimination if the records produced are those of a 
corporation or other collective entity. Second, it examines the more 
recent three-part analysis adopted in Fisher and Doe which extends 
fifth amendment protection to a documents producer only if her pro-
duction of documents involves compelled testimonial incrimination. 
Part II surveys recent attempts of lower courts to apply these two 
conflicting theories to claims by persons compelled to produce corpo-
rate records. It argues that although the practical impact of the posi-
tion of the Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits differs little from that 
of the Sixth and Eighth Circuits, the approach employed by the for-
mer courts is correct. Part II first demonstrates that under the Fisher-
Doe analysis, a person compelled to produce corporate records would, 
in certain situations, be entitled to invoke the privilege against self M 
incrimination. Second, it argues that the rationale of the entity doc-
trine no longer supports the denial of fifth amendment protection to a 
person who may be compelled to make incriminating testimonial ad-
missions by producing corporate documents. 
I. THE Two APPROACHES 
The resolution of the question whether or not to apply the fifth 
amendment analysis in Fisher and Doe to production of corporate doc-
uments requires an understanding of both the entity approach to selfM 
incrimination and the more recent Fisher-Doe analysis. This part inM 
troduces these approaches and discusses their application to the comM 
pelled production of corporate records. 
A. The Entity Rule and Its Extension to Entity Agents 
Prior to Fisher, the Supreme Court analyzed self-incrimination 
claims of corporate records producers by examining the nature of the 
records and the capacity in which they were held. A person holding 
entity documents in a representative capacity could not invoke her 
personal fifth amendment privilege in order to avoid producing those 
13. The term "subpoena" in this Note is intended to encompass administrative summonses 
and court orders to obtain documents in addition to subpoenas duces tecum issued to grand jury 
and trial witnesses. 
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documents no matter how incriminating they were to her, while a per-
son holding private records in a personal capacity could.14 This dis-
tinction between the treatment of entity records and private records 
has a long history. In the landmark decision Boyd v. United States, 15 
the Supreme Court extended fifth amendment protection to persons 
compelled to produce private papers.16 In Hale v. Henkel, 17 the Court 
limited this protection to individuals, holding that corporations have 
no fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.18 The privi-
lege, the Court later explained, should be "limited to its historic func-
tion of protecting only the natural individual from compulsory 
incrimination through his own testimony or personal records." 19 
The cdurt subsequently enlarged this entity rule to prohibit indi-
vidual representatives of an entity, as well as the entity itself, from 
refusing to produce entity documents on fifth amendment grounds. In 
Wilson v. United States, 20 the Court held that the entity rule precludes 
an individual from asserting his personal fifth amendment privilege to 
avoid disclosing subpoenaed entity documents, regardless of whether 
the subpoena was addressed to the corporation or to the individual, 
and no matter how personally incriminating the contents of the docu-
ments. In Wilson, a subpoena duces tecum addressed to a corporation 
was served on the corporation's president, already indicted for mail 
fraud and conspiracy. The Court rejected the president's fifth amend-
ment argument for resisting production. First, it reasoned that the 
14. See generally 1 F. BAILEY & H. ROTIIBLATI, DEFENDING BUSINESS AND WHITE COL-
LAR CRIMES FEDERAL AND STATE§ 5:21 {2d ed. 1984); 1 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE§ 8:12{b)-(c) (1984 & Supp. 1986); 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE§§ 2259a, 2259b (J. 
McNaughton rev. ed. 1961 & Supp. 1986); Heidt, The Fifth Amendment Privilege and Documents 
- Cutting Fisher's Tangled Line, 49 Mo. L. REV. 439 (1984); Note, Books and Records and the 
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 33 BROOKLYN L. REv. 70 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Note, 
Books and Records Privilege]; Developments in the Law - Corporate Crime: Regulating Corpo-
rate Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1227, 1281-83 (1979) [hereinafter 
cited as Developments - Corporate Crime]; Note, Business Records and the Fifth Amendment 
Right Against Self-Incrimination, 38 OHIO ST. L.J. 351 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Note, Busi-
ness Records and the Fifth Amendment]; Note, Abolition of Fifth Amendment Protection for the 
Contents of Preexisting Documents: United States v. Doe, 38 Sw. L.J. 1023 (1984) [hereinafter 
cited as Note, Abolition of Fifth Amendment Protection]; Recent Developments - Bellis v. 
United States: Constitutional Law - The Fifth Amendment - Derogation of the Fifth Amend-
ment as it Pertains to Documents of Organized Entities, 3 HOFSTRA L. REV. 467 (1975). 
15. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
16. 116 U.S. at 634-35. 
17. 201 U.S. 43 (1906). 
18. 201 U.S. at 74-75. 
19. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 701 (1944); see also Cramer, Back From the Brink: 
Boyd's Private Papers Protection and the Sole Proprietor's Business Records, 21 AM. Bus. L.J. 
367, 374 n.38 (1984); 1 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 14, at 694 (privilege designed to 
protect interests unique to the individual); 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 14, at 353 (there can be no 
abuses of physical compulsion for a corporation since the accused is an artificial entity and the 
sentiment requiring the government to bear the entire burden of building a criminal case against 
the accused is almost entirely confined to human beings). 
20. 221 U.S. 361 (1911). 
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records were not the president's private papers, but rather those of the 
corporation, which he held in a representative capacity.21 Second, the 
Court noted that the president had accepted the duty to permit inspec-
tion of the records when he assumed their custody.22 
This entity doctrine applies to the records of unincorporated as-
sociations as well as corporations. In United States v. White, 23 the 
Court denied the privilege to a labor union,24 and in Bellis v. United 
States, 25 the Court held that a partner of a defunct three-person law 
firm could not assert his personal fifth amendment privilege to avoid 
producing partnership records.26 Such records are not privileged, the 
Bellis Court explained, because a partnership, like a corporation or a 
labor union, is a "well organized and structured" entity with an estab-
lished identity independent of its individual members.27 In addition to 
unincorporated associations28 and partnerships,29 entities whose 
records are not privileged include dissolved corporations,30 single 
stockholder corporations,31 professional corporations,32 and tenancies 
in common. 33 Standing alone, Bellis and the other entity decisions 
prevent a person from asserting her fifth amendment privilege to avoid 
producing entity documents. 
21. 221 U.S. at 377-78. 
22. 221 U.S. at 381-82. Part II infra examines in detail the Court's rationale for denying the 
privilege to entity agents ordered to produce entity records. 
23. 322 U.S. 694 (1944). 
24. 322 U.S. at 698-705; see also Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 122-23, 128 (1957) 
(no privilege for records of union). 
25. 417 U.S. 85 (1974). 
26. 417 U.S. at 95-101. 
27. 417 U.S. at 92-93. 
28. See Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 371-72 (1951) (records of political party not 
privileged). 
29. See Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974). Bellis noted there may be some partner-
ships that retain the privilege. 417 U.S. at 101 ("This might be a different case if it involved a 
small family partnership, ... or •.. if there were some other pre-existing relationship of confiden-
tiality among the partners."). Despite this suggested exception, courts generally have not ex-
tended the privilege to family partnerships. See, e.g., United States v. Alderson, 646 F.2d 421 
(9th Cir. 1981). But see In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dueces Tecum (Doe), 605 F. Supp. 174 
(E.D.N.Y. 1985) (husband-wife consulting partnership entitled to fifth amendment privilege). 
30. See Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478 (1913); Grant v. United States, 227 U.S. 74 
(1913). 
31. See Grant v. United States, 227 U.S. 74 (1913); see also cases cited in Heidt, supra note 
14, at 475 n.149. 
32. See, e.g., United States v. Radetsky, 535 F.2d 556 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 820 
(1976). 
33. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Shiffman), 576 F.2d 703 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 
830 (1978) (co-tenancy); see also United States v. Harrison, 653 F.2d 359 (8th Cir. 1981) (family 
trust); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Hutchinson), 633 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1980) (trust). 
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B. The Fisher-Doe Approach: The Act of Production as Compelled 
Testimonial Incrimination 
In the entity cases, the Court did not extend any greater fifth 
amendment protection to testimonial admissions implicit in producing 
records than it extended to testimony contained within the records 
themselves - neither were privileged. In 1976, however, the Court 
held for the first time that the fifth amendment may protect testimony 
implicit in the act of producing records even when it does not protect 
the contents of the records. 34 In Fisher v. United States, 35 two taxpay-
ers objected to government summonses to produce workpapers pre-
pared by their accountants. 36 In rejecting the taxpayers' fifth 
amendment claim, the Court adopted a three-part analysis for claims 
of self-incrimination by producing records. For the privilege to apply, 
there must be first, testimonial communication, 37 second, compulsion, 3s 
and third, incrimination. 39 Eight years later, in United States v. Doe, 40 
the Court again applied the Fisher test, upholding, in part, the fifth 
amendment claim of a sole proprietor subpoenaed to produce his busi-
ness records. The opinion acknowledged the sole proprietor's right 
not to be compelled to produce the documents himself, but rejected his 
claim of a privilege to prevent disclosure of their contents.41 A brief 
explanation of the Fisher-Doe three-part approach follows. 
1. The Testimonial Communication Requirement 
Relying on the language and theoretical basis of the fifth amend-
ment, the Court has interpreted the privilege against self-incrimination 
to apply only to testimonial communication, not to nontesti-
monial acts.42 A person who is compelled to give blood,43 create 
34. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410 (1976). 
35. 425 U.S. 391 (1976). 
36. The summonses were addressed to the taxpayers' attorneys, to whom the taxpayers had 
delivered the documents. Because of the attorney-client privilege, the Court examined whether 
the fifth amendment would have protected the taxpayers had they not turned the records over to 
their attorneys. 425 U.S. at 402. 
37. See notes 42-59 infra and accompanying text. 
38. See notes 60-68 infra and accompanying text. 
39. See notes 69-75 infra and accompanying text. Fisher's three-part test is now well estab-
lished. See, e.g., United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 613 (1984); United States v. Authement, 
607 F.2d 1129, 1131 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam); First Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Schamanek, 
684 P.2d 1257, 1264-65 (Utah 1984); Cramer, supra note 19, at 379 & nn.73-75 (and cases cited 
therein). 
40. 465 U.S. 605 (1984). 
41. 465 U.S. at 612-17. Although the approach the Court adopted in Fisher and reapplied in 
Doe recognized for the first time that the fifth amendment protects the act of producing docu-
ments, it essentially narrowed the reach of the amendment by eliminating the privilege for the 
contents of many previously protected nonentity documents. See notes 66-67 infra and accompa-
nying text. 
42. See, e.g., Fisher, 425 U.S. at 408; Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 n.5 (1966). 
43. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 765 (1966). 
1550 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 84:1544 
voice44 or handwriting45 exemplars, furnish fingerprints,46 participate 
in a lineup, 47 try on clothes, 48 or display wounds, 49 is not protected by 
the fifth amendment even though she may be forced to provide impor-
tant evidence against herself. Such evidence is not of a testimonial or 
communicative nature.50 To be testimonial, evidence must reveal the 
contents of one's mind. 51 
In Fisher, the Court held that the mere act of producing docu-
ments in response to a subpoena or summons has communicative as-
pects. Production of documents may constitute testimony by the 
producer that the documents exist, are in her possession or control, 
and are the documents she believes are described by the subpoena.52 
Although the argument that production of evidence implicitly admits 
existence, possession, and authenticity is not novel, the Court did not 
grant these admissions fifth amendment protection until Fisher. 53 In 
Curcio v. United States, 54 for example, the Court noted that the act of 
producing union records involved potentially incriminating admis-
sions, but reasoned that the fifth amendment protected only a pro-
ducer's "oral" testimony, not those admissions implicit in 
44. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 7 (1973). 
45. United States v. Euge, 444 U.S. 707, 718 (1980); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266-
67 (1967). 
46. See, e.g., In re Maguire, 571 F.2d 675, 676 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 911 (1978). 
47. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 222-23 (1967). 
48. Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252-53 (1910). 
49. See 1 F. BAILEY & H. ROTHBLATI, supra note 14, at§ 527 n.16. 
SO. See generally 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 14, at§ 2265; Arenella, Schmerber and the Privi-
lege Against Self-Incrimination: A Reappraisal, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 31, 36-42 (1982); Dann, 
The Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Extorting Physical Evidence from a 
Suspect, 43 S. CAL. L. REV. 597, 611-12 (1970). 
51. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966); see also Developments - Corpo-
rate Crime, supra note 14, at 1283-84 ("mental information processing" is required). 
52. 425 U.S. at 410; see Doe, 465 U.S. at 613 (quoting Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410 (1976)); see also 
Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 475 (1976); In re Grand Jury Matter (Brown), 768 F.2d 
525, 531 n.S (3d Cir. 1985) (en bane) (Becker, J., concurring) (production constitutes nonverbal 
assertive act which is nonhearsay under FED. R. Evm. 801); Heidt, supra note 14, at 473 n.139 
(methods for introducing act-of-production testimony into evidence include "testimony of the 
investigator who issued the subpoena for documents and witnessed their submission by the per-
son subpoenaed" and "any cover letter that the person subpoenaed might have included with the 
documents verifying that they are the documents requested"). 
53. See Glanzer, Grand Jury Investigations, in PARALLEL GRAND JURY AND ADMINISTRA-
TIVE AGENCY INVESTIGATIONS 527 (N. Kaplan, P. Friedman, R. Bennett & H. Trainor eds. 
1981). For earlier recognition that production involves admissions see, e.g., Couch v. United 
States, 409 U.S. 322, 346-48 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 
118, 125 (1957). See also Haywood v. United States, 268 F. 795, 802 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 256 
U.S. 689 (1920) (witness' production of documents is her voucher of their genuineness); People v. 
DeFore, 242 N.Y. 13, 27, 150 N.E. 585, 590 (1926) (Cardozo, J.) (recognizing the testimonial 
aspects of production); Mansfield, The Albertson Case: Conflict Between the Privilege Against 
Self-Incrimination and the Government's Need for Information, 1966 SUP. Cr. REV. 103, 125, 
137 (act of production may have testimonial value). 
54. 354 U.S. 118 (1957). 
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production. 55 
Not every act of production involves testimonial communication. 
Even if a person always makes certain admissions by producing docu-
ments, 56 Fisher held that the testimonial character of these admissions 
varies with the facts and circumstances of each case. 57 Justice White 
wrote: 
[W]hether the tacit averments of the taxpayer are both "testimonial" and 
"incriminating" ... perhaps do not lend themselves to categorical an-
swers; their resolution may instead depend on the facts and circum-
stances of particular cases or classes thereof. . . . 
It is doubtful that implicitly admitting the existence and possession 
of the papers rises to the level of testimony within the protection of the 
Fifth Amendment .... Surely the Government is in no way relying on 
the "truth telling" of the taxpayer to prove the existence of or his access 
to the documents. . . . The existence and location of the papers are a 
foregone conclusion and the taxpayer adds little or nothing to the sum 
total of the Government's information by conceding that he in fact has 
the papers. 58 
Whether production admissions are testimonial depends, apparently, 
on how heavily the government must rely on the admissions in order 
to prove the existence, possession, and authenticity of the documents 
produced. 59 
2. The Compulsion Requirement 
Only those testimonial communications that are compelled are 
privileged. 6° Compulsion can result when a police officer, 61 agen-
55. 354 U.S. at 122-25 (1957). For a discussion of Curcio, see notes 168-69 infra and accom-
panying text. 
56. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, John Doe, 754 F.2d 154, 157 (6th Cir. 1985) 
(Jones, J., concurring) (stating that "Doe stands for the proposition that compelled production is 
equivalent to three testimonial admissions ... ") (emphasis added). 
57. 425 U.S. at 410. 
58. 425 U.S. at 410-11 (citation omitted). 
59. It is unclear whether the Court in Fisher applied the same analysis to determine the 
testimonial sufficiency of the authenticity admission as it applied to the admissions that the docu-
ments exist and are possessed by the producer. 425 U.S. at 413. Perhaps the Court denied the 
privilege for the admission of authentication because it did not consider the admission incrimi-
nating enough to be testimonial. On the other hand, the Court may have recognized that the 
admission of authenticity was testimonial communication but refused to extend the privilege only 
after determining that the admission would not incriminate the taxpayer. Relying on the findings 
of the district court below, the Court in Doe did little to clear up this ambiguity. 465 U.S. at 613-
14. 
Part II will examine the varied applications of the Fisher test pertaining to the testimonial 
sufficiency of act-of-production admissions and the implications of that test for corporate records 
producers. See notes 86-96 infra and accompanying text. 
60. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 396-97 (1976); Couch v. United States, 409 
U.S. 322, 327-29 (1973). See generally Note, Abolition of Fifth Amendment Protection, supra note 
14. 
61. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. ·436 (1966) (custodial interrogation). 
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cy, 62 legislative body, 63 court, 64 or grand jury65 orders a person to 
testify. An individual's testimony in response to a subpoena directed 
to that individual is compelled because the subpoena compels that par-
ticular person to testify. Doe held that because a subpoena duces te-
cum does not require a person to restate or affirm the truth of 
communications contained within voluntarily prepared documents, 
the contents of subpoenaed documents are not compelled.66 However, 
any testimonial admissions implicit in producing those documents are 
compelled. The result is that production of a document may be privi-
leged even when its contents are not. 67 The situation this Note ad-
dresses, like that involved in Fisher and Doe, is one in which a person 
attempts to claim her fifth amendment privilege to avoid being com-
pelled to produce documents and make the admissions implicit in pro-
duction, but could not assert her privilege to prevent disclosure of the 
contents of the documents if they were produced by some other 
means.68 
3. The Incrimination Requirement 
Even if a subpoena to produce documents compels a person to 
make testimonial admissions by responding, that person has no fifth 
amendment privilege unless those testimonial admissions might in-
criminate her in future criminal proceedings. 69 Courts have formu-
62. See Weston v. United States Dept. of Hons. and Urban Dev., 724 F.2d 943, 94748 (D.C. 
Cir. 1983) (administrative hearing). 
63. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957). 
64. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Vargas), 727 F.2d 941, 944 (10th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 105 S. Ct. 90 (1984) 
65. See, e.g., United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 612 (1984). 
66. 465 U.S. at 611-12; see also Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 473 (1976) (the con· 
tents of seized records are not compelled since author voluntarily committed them to writing); 
Note, The Rights of Criminal Defendants and the Subpoenas Duces Tecum: The Aftermath of 
Fisher v. United States, 95 HARV. L. REV. 683, 685 (1982). 
67. See United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 
(1976); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328 (1973) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 228 
U.S. 457, 458 (1913)); In re Kave, 760 F.2d 343, 356 (1st Cir. 1985). 
68. Alternative means of production include using a different producer, see Couch, 409 U.S. 
at 329 (no compulsion against taxpayer when summons directed her accountant to produce 
records), or a search warrant, see note 158 infra. 
The Court has suggested that the subpoenaed person's possession of the records may be so 
"temporary and insignificant" that the primary possessor may be able to assert her own fifth 
amendment privilege through a doctrine of constructive possession. See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 398; 
Couch, 409 U.S. at 322, 333 & n.16; see also In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Manges), 745 F.2d 
1250, 1252 (9th Cir. 1984) (stating that constructive possession ackilowledges "that possession of 
records by an employee might be so insignificant or fleeting as to leave essentially unaltered the 
incriminating testimonial effects the act of production would visit upon the employer"). See 
generally 1 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 14, at § 8:12(d); White Collar Crime: Third 
Annual Survey of Law, 22 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 279, 569 n.2424 (1985), and cases cited therein 
[hereinafter cited as White Collar Crime]. 
69. The privilege may be asserted in any civil, criminal, administrative, judicial, investigatory 
or adjudicatory proceeding. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 44445 (1972); see also 
Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 75-77 (1973) (grand jury); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 49-55 (1967) 
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lated various tests to discern when evidence might be incriminating. 70 
Most recently, in Doe, the Court suggested that a person claiming the 
privilege must demonstrate that the "risk of incrimination [is] 'sub-
stantial and real' and not 'trifling or imaginary.' "71 The government 
may then rebut that finding with evidence that the facts admitted -
the existence, possession, and authenticity of the records - are "fore-
gone conclusion[s].''72 The Court's use of the phrase "substantial 
risk" indicates that what is incriminating about a piece of evidence is 
that the government is likely to use it. Similarly, the "foregone con-
clusion" test designates an admission as nonincriminating if there is so 
much other evidence to prove the fact admitted that the government is 
not likely to use that particular admission as its means of proof.73 De-
spite the criticism prompted by the Court's "foregone conclusion" 
test, 14 the test does provide some limited fifth amendment protection 
for those who would be forced to admit existence, possession, and au-
(juvenile proceedings); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471 (1966) (custodial interrogation); 
Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 195-96 (1957) (legislative investigation); McCarthy v. 
Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924) (privilege applies in both civil and criminal proceedings); Boyd 
v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35 (1886) (privilege protects documents in a civil forfeiture 
action); Minnesota State Bar Assn. v. Divorce Assistance Assn., 311 Minn. 276, 277-78, 280-81, 
248 N.W.2d 733, 736-38 (1976) (privilege protects documents in a civil case for injunctive relief); 
Rice v. State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 208 Okla. 440, 441-42, 257 P.2d 292, 293-94 (1953) 
(same). See generally 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 14, at § 2252. 
The privilege does not protect a witness from being forced to give testimony that may cause 
her embarrassment or scorn, injure her friends, subject herself to civil liability or loss of employ-
ment, or harm herself in any way other than subjecting herself to criminal liability. See Ullmann 
v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 430-31 (1955) (other harmful, but not incriminating effects); see 
also Allen v. Illinois, 106 S. Ct. 2988, 2992-95 (1986) (proceedings under Illinois Sexually Dan-
gerous Persons Act not "criminal" within meaning of fifth amendment). 
70. See United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 128 (1980) (The threat of incrimination 
must be " 'substantial and real' and not merely 'trifling or imaginary.' ") (quoting Marchetti v. 
United States, 390 U.S. 39, 53 (1968)); Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 487 (1951) 
(incriminating if answer "might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result"). See 
generally Heidt, The Conjurer's Circle: The Fifth Amendment Privilege in Civil Cases, 91 YALE 
L.J. 1062, 1071-74, 1088-94 (1982); White Collar Crime, supra note 68, at 562-63. 
71. 465 U.S. at 614 n.13 (quoting Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 53 (1968)). 
72. Doe held that there were sufficient findings in the record to leave undisturbed the lower 
court's factual determination regarding the risk of incrimination by admitting existence and pos-
session. The district court had found that the risk was substantial where the respondent argued 
that his production would concede the existence of the records and that the government needed 
his production to authenticate the documents at trial. The Court noted that the government 
could have rebutted this finding by producing evidence that possession, existence, and authenti-
cation were a "foregone conclusion.'' 465 U.S. at 614 n.13 (quoting Fisher v. United States, 421 
U.S. 391, 411 (1976)). 
73. Prior to Doe, some formulations of what is incriminating appeared to emphasize the 
existence of risk more than the degree of risk. See, e.g., Hoffman, 341U.S.479, 486-87 (1951); In 
re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 609 F.2d 867, 872 (7th Cir. 1979) (standard is possibility, not 
likelihood, of prosecution); United States v. Johnson, 488 F.2d 1206, 1209 (1st Cir. 1973); Coffey 
v. United States, 198 F.2d 438, 440 (3d Cir. 1952); 1 F. BAILEY & H. ROTHBLAIT, supra note 
14, at § 5. 15; Falknor, Self Incrimination Privilege: Links in the Chain, 5 V AND. L. REV. 479, 
483 (1952). The Court has stated, however, that the fifth amendment requires a substantial and 
real risk, not the mere presence of risk. See generally Heidt, supra note 70, at 1071-74. 
74. See, e.g., Heidt, supra note 14, at 480-82 & nn.169-71. But see BUSINESS CRIMES: A 
GUIDE FOR CoRPORATE AND DEFENSE COUNSEL 171-74 (J. Glekel ed. 1982). See generally 
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thenticity of records through the production of those records. 75 
II. CORPORATE RECORDS PRODUCTION: THE Two APPROACHES 
COMBINED 
Relying on the entity theory, the Court has held that compelling a 
corporate representative to produce corporate documents is constitu-
tional, even when the documents incriminate that individual.76 The 
question before the Third Circuit in In re Grand Jury Matter 
(Brown), 77 the Sixth Circuit in In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Morgan-
stern), 1s and the Eighth Circuit in In re Grand Jury Subpoena (85-W-
71-5), 19 was whether or not the Court's recognition of fifth amend-
ment protection for the act of production in Fisher and Doe supple-
mented or replaced the entity doctrine so that a person's claim of self-
incrimination to resist producing corporate records might prevail. so 
Gerstein, The Demise of Boyd: Self Incrimination and Private Papers in the Burger Court, 27 
UCLA L. REv. 343, 380-82 (1979); Note, supra note 66, at 686-88. 
75. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Nov. 13, 1984 (Doe), 616 F. 
Supp. 1159, 1162 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (witness in real danger of incriminating himself if he complies 
with subpoena because he has been told he is target of a grand jury investigation, F.B.I. agents 
have been asking third patties about his business activities, and government refuses to confer 
even limited immunity upon him). 
76. See Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974) (individual cannot rely upon the fifth 
amendment privilege to avoid producing the records of a collective entity which are in his posses-
sion in a representative capacity even if those records might incriminate him personally); Curcio 
v. United States, 354 U.S. 118 (1957) (union records); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 
(1944) (union records); Grant v. United States, 227 U.S. 74 (1912); Wilson v. United States, 221 
U.S. 361 (1910). 
77. 768 F.2d 525 (3d Cir. 1985) (en bane). 
78. 771 F.2d 143 (6th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 594 (1985). 
79. 784 F.2d 857 (8th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. See v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 59 (1986). 
80. In Brown, the sole owner of an incorporated accounting firm appealed a contempt order 
entered for his refusal to comply with a subpoena duces tecum seeking production of the corpo-
ration's records before a grand jury. The court characterized the issue before it as "a narrow one. 
We must decide whether a person, simply by virtue of his status as a custodian of a corporation's 
records, can be compelled to make self-incriminating disclosures that are testimonial, i.e., com-
municative or assertive in nature." 768 F.2d at 526. Upon reargument, the Third Circuit, sitting 
en bane, reversed the district court's judgment that he could. 768 F.2d at 529. 
Brown's attorneys argued that "reconciliation of the cases [decided under the 'old' and 'new' 
fifth amendment doctrines] is impossible" and that the new fifth amendment jurisprudence of 
Fisher and Doe required a determination of whether Brown's act of production was protected by 
the fifth amendment. Brief for Appellant at 6, 9. For a general discussion of Brown, see Note, 
Sole Shareholder's Privilege, supra note 8. 
In Morganstern, the Morgansterns appealed the district court's denial of their motion to 
quash a grand jury subpoena to produce corporate and partnership records claiming that produc-
tion would violate their privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. The original panel of 
the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment, but upon rehearing en bane, the court 
affirmed the district court. 771 F.2d at 144. 
In In re Grand Jury Subpoena (85-W-71-5), a federal grand jury subpoenaed the attorney of 
an officer of a defunct corporation for documents concerning a construction contract with the 
Defense Department. The district court denied the attorney's motion to quash the subpoena on 
the ground that the act-of-production privilege did not apply to corporate documents. The court 
of appeals affirmed. 784 F.2d 857, 859 (8th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. See v. United States, 
107 S. Ct. 59 (1986). For other cases, see note 7 supra. 
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In Brown, the Third Circuit distinguished pre-Fisher cases in which 
the Court had denied the fifth amendment privilege to corporate 
records producers. Rejecting arguments that applying Doe to corpo-
rate as well as sole proprietor records would undermine the purposes 
of the entity doctrine, the Third Circuit held that Brown was entitled 
to fifth amendment protection if he could establish that production 
would incriminate him. 81 Reaching a contrary result, the Sixth and 
Eighth Circuits held that the entity rule was the appropriate analysis 
for corporate records production cases and maintained that the Fisher-
Doe test was limited to records of individuals and sole proprietors. 82 
The Sixth Circuit also noted that even if Doe applied, "production of 
[corporate] records is not a testimonial act of the custodian."83 
These cases illustrate the two major arguments against allowing a 
producer of corporate records to claim her privilege against self-in-
crimination: First, under the Fisher-Doe test, production of corporate 
records is not testimonial or incriminating; second, because of the en-
tity rule, the Fisher-Doe test does not even apply to the production of 
corporate records. This Part of the Note refutes these arguments. 
First, it explains that, under the Fisher-Doe analysis, a subpoena to 
produce corporate records could result in compelled testimonial in-
crimination. Second, it argues that applying the fifth amendment priv-
ilege to such claims is consistent with the underlying principles of the 
entity approach. 
A. Producing Corporate Records: Compelled Testimonial 
Incrimination 
Some of the courts that have applied the Fisher-Doe test to the 
production of corporate records84 have, through restrictive interpreta-
81. Brown, 768 F.2d at 528-29. The Second Circuit also suggested that the Fisher analysis 
applies to corporate records producers. The court explained that the government may still attain 
the goals of the entity rule by addressing subpoenas for entity documents to the entity rather than 
an individual agent. See In re Two Grand Jury Subpoenae Duces Tecum, 769 F.2d 52, 56-57 (2d 
Cir. 1985); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Issued to 13 Corps., 775 F.2d 43, 47-48 (2d Cir. 1985), 
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1459 (1986) (when a subpoena is addressed to a corporation, dissolution 
of corporation does not enhance fifth amendment protection for agent of a corporation). 
82. Morganstern, 771 F.2d at 147-48; In re Grand Jury Subpoena (85-W-71-5), 784 F.2d 857, 
861-82 (8th Cir. 1986). 
83. Morganstern, 771 F.2d at 148. 
84. Lower courts have split over whether Bellis precludes applying Fisher-Doe to these cases 
at all. The Third Circuit in Brown, the Second Circuit in In re Two Grand Jury Subpoenae 
Duces Tecum, 769 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1985), and the dissent in Morganstern each believed that the 
analysis of Fisher and Doe supplemented, but did not overrule, Bellis. The Second and Third 
Circuits' interpretation of Supreme Court precedent requires application of the Fisher-Doe test to 
all cases in which an individual is compelled to produce records, corporate or otherwise. See 
Brown, 768 F.2d at 528; In re Two Grand Jury Subpoenae Duces Tecum, 769 F.2d 52, 59 (2d 
Cir. 1985); Morganstern, 771 F.2d at 149 (Jones, J., dissenting). The Third Circuit reasoned that 
the Supreme Court's entity cases did not preclude Doe's application to corporate records produc-
tion since the entity cases did not address the issue of whether testimony inherent in the produc-
tion of the documents was privileged; the Court had held only that the c,ontents of entity 
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tions of the testimonial and incrimination prongs of the test, effectively 
precluded fifth amendment protection for persons compelled to pro-
duce corporate records. 85 This section argues that under Doe, a person 
compelled to produce corporate documents may make admissions that 
are just as testimonial and incriminating as the admissions made by a 
person subpoenaed for her personal proprietorship documents. 
Admissions implicit in producing records do not lose their testimo-
nial quality if the records belong to a corporation rather than to an 
individual. 86 Yet, struggling to apply the Fisher-Doe test to corporate 
documents, several courts have held that the act of producing corpo-
rate documents is not testimonial. 87 Although Doe protected the testi-
monial communication implicit in producing the documents of a sole 
proprietor, language in Fisher suggests that the admissions made by 
producing corporate documents are not sufficiently testimonial to re-
ceive fifth amendment protection. 88 Many lower courts have inter-
preted Fisher to mean that any implicit admission made by a person 
producing documents is not testimony under the fifth amendment 
when the possession and existence of the documents is already known 
documents were not privileged. 768 F.2d at 528 n.2. See also Morganstern, 771 F.2d at 14849 
(Jones, J., dissenting) (stating Bellis does not foreclose act-of-production privilege for corporate 
documents). 
Some cases decided before Bellis recognized the incriminating potential of the act of produc-
ing entity documents and specifically denied the privilege for production as well as contents. 
Because Fisher later extended the fifth amendment privilege to production admissions, however, 
these cases are distinguishable. For example, in Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118 (1957), the 
Court explained: 
The custodian's act of producing books or records in response to a subpoena duces tecum is 
itself a representation that the documents produced are those demanded by the subpoena. 
Requiring the custodian to identify or authenticate the documents for admission in evidence 
merely makes explicit what is implict in the production itself. The custodian is subjected to 
little, if any, further danger of incrimination. 
354 U.S. at 125; see also United States v. Austin-Bagley Corp., 31 F.2d 229 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 
279 U.S. 863 (1929) (corporation required to produce corporate records may be required to 
authenticate them as well since this type of testimony is ancillary to production). 
85. The compulsion element of Fisher's three-part test is not an issue here. No court has 
suggested that a subpoena duces tecum for corporate documents exerts less compulsion than a 
subpoena for personal documents. Nothing about a person's status as a corporate agent or the 
corporate nature of the documents subpoenaed diminishes the compulsion a subpoena duces 
tecum exerts on that person. See, e.g., United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984). 
86. The message remains the same: "These documents exist, they were in my possession, and 
I believe that they are the records described in the subpoena." See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 14, 
§ 2264(1) (testimonial disclosure implicit in production of documents). But see Morganstern, 771 
F.2d at 148 ("[P]roduction of [corporate] records is not a testimonial net of the custodian. Pro-
duction of the records communicates nothing more than the fact that the one producing them is 
a representative of the corporation or partnership."). 
87. See notes 89-90 infra. 
88. The Court in Fisher argued that it had never protected the implicit admissions made 
when a person produced a handwriting exemplar or corporate documents, "despite the fact that 
producing the documents tacitly admits their existence and their location in the hands of their 
possessor." The Court justified its conclusion that Fisher's admissions would not be testimonial 
by noting that "[t]he existence and possession or control of the subpoenaed documents [is] no 
more in issue here than in the [handwriting and corporate documents] cases .••• " 425 U.S. at 
411-12. 
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to the government. 89 Some courts go so far as to 1 say that the act of 
production has no testimonial value unless the government actually 
uses the act to implicate the producer.9° 
These cases misapply the concept of incrimination - whether the 
testimonial evidence might eventually be used to incriminate the pro-
ducer in a criminal prosecution - by using it to determine whether 
89. See, e.g., United States v. Schlansky, 709 F.2d 1079, 1084 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 
465 U.S. 1099 (1984); United States v. Praetorius, 622 F.2d 1054, 1062-63 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. 
denied, 449 U.S. 860 (1980); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Nov. 13, 1984 
(Doe), 616 F. Supp. 1159, 1161 (E.D.N.Y. 1985); People v. Copicotto, 50 N.Y.2d 222, 229, 406 
N.E.2d 465, 470, 428 N.Y.S.2d 649, 654 (1980); see also In re Grand Jury Empanelled Feb. 14, 
1978 (Markowitz), 603 F.2d 469, 477 (3d Cir. 1979) (suggesting admissions of existence, posses-
sion, and authenticity are not testimonial because, in the case of an attorney's possession of a 
client's basic corporate records, such admissions are "unremarkable"); In re 'Siegel, 208 N.J. 
Super. 588, 593, 506 A.2d 776, }78 (1986) (production of records required by law to be main-
tained is not compelled self-incrimination because the records are "already known to exist"). 
A related approach is to define an admission as testimonial "if it can be used by the govern-
ment to show the existence, possession, or authenticity of the documents requested." In re 
Grand Jury Proceedings on Feb. 4, 1982 (Terry), 759 F.2d 1418, 1421 (9th Cir. 1985) (emphasis 
added); see also United States v. Amorosa, 84-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ~ 9453 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) 
(witness' "inability to vouch for the accuracy of Mrs. Soltanoff's letters ... bars finding that his 
act of production would implicitly authenticate them"). 
Yet another reason provided for refusing to recognize the admissions as testimony is that the 
documents could be authenticated by other means or by someone else. See United States v. 
Schlansky, 709 F.2d 1079, 1084 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1099 (1984); In re Matter 
of Grand Jury Empanelled Jan. 18, 1982, 579 F. Supp. 479, 481 (E.D.N.C. 1983); United States 
v. Braswell, 436 F. Supp. 699, 674-75 (E.D.N.C. 1977); People v. Copicotto, 50 N.Y.2d 222, 229, 
406 N.E.2d 465, 428 N.Y.S.2d 649, 654 (1980). For a discussion of when the existence, posses-
sion, and authenticity of subpoenaed corporate documents can be considered a "foregone conclu-
sion" within the meaning of Fisher and Doe, see note 99 infra and accompanying text. 
90. The Sixth Circuit in Morganstem wrote that production by a corporate custodian is not 
testimony, note 86 supra, but it conceded that an attempt by the government to implicate the 
custodian on the basis of the act of production would "add testimonial value" to what was other-
wise not testimonial and would thus be subject to a motion to suppress. Morganstem, 771 F.2d 
at 148 (citing In re Grand Jury Empanelled Mar. 8, 1983, 722 F.2d 294, 297 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. 
dismissed, 465 U.S. 1085 (1984), and United States v. Schlanski, 709 F.2d 1079, 1083 (6th Cir. 
1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1099 (1984)). The Eighth Circuit expressly adopted this aspect of 
the Sixth Circuit's position. In re Grand Jury Subpoena (85-W-71-5), 784 F.2d 857, 861 (8th 
Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. See v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 59 (1986); see also Note, Fisher v. 
United States: Is the Taxpayer's Privilege Against Self-Incrimination a Bar to Production of 
Records Held by His Attorney?, 1977 DET. C. L. REv. 429, 436 ("If nothing is derived from the 
averments, there is no testimony; and without testimony there can be no self-incrimination."). 
These courts sidestepped the Supreme Court's mandate in Doe by failing to require a formal 
grant of immunity for these witnesses and instead compelling their admissions with only the 
assurance that if the government tr:ies to use the "testimony" against them, the testimony will be 
subject to suppression: 
We decline to extend the jurisdiction of courts to include prospective grants of use im-
munity in the absence of the formal request that the statute requires ...• The decision to 
seek use immunity necessarily involves a balancing of the Government's interest in ob-
taining information against the risk that immunity will frustrate the Government's attempts 
to prosecute the subject of the investigation ...• Congress expressly left this decision exclu-
sively to the Justice Department. If, on remand, the appropriate official concludes that it is 
desirable to compel respondent to produce his business records, the statutory procedure for 
requesting use immunity will be available. 
Doe, 465 U.S. at 616-17 (footnotes and citations omitted); see also note 131 infra. 
Other cases fail to give a reason why producing business documents is not testimonial. See, 
e.g., United States v. Osborn, 561 F.2d 1334, 1339 (9th Cir. 1977). 
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the act is testimonial. First, interpreting Fisher to mean that the testi-
monial quality of an admission must be measured by the value of the 
admission to the government is inconsistent with the Court's earlier 
tests for testimonial quality. Earlier tests for testimonial quality cen-
tered on whether the evidence revealed the contents of a person's 
mind.91 Often, persons compelled to produce the most useful evidence 
received no constitutional protection because the evidence was "non-
testimonial."92 Potential for use in a criminal prosecution is the basis 
for identifying testimony that is incriminating. 93 The Court never used 
it to identify what is testimonial before Fisher. 94 Even if incrimination 
must play some role in determining testimonial quality, Fisher cannot 
mean that the implicit admissions involved in the act of producing 
corporate documents are never incriminating enough to be testimo-
nial, as Morganstern suggested. 95 To classify all admissions made by 
producing corporate documents as nontestimonial precludes the case-
by-case analysis mandated by Fisher. 96 
It is also improper to characterize all such admissions as nonin-
criminating. If the incriminating nature of all testimony is measured 
by one standard under the fifth amendment, the "foregone conclu-
sion" test that the Court used in Fisher and Doe should apply to the 
testimony implicit in producing entity, as well as nonentity, records. 
This "foregone conclusion" standard97 does not preclude a finding 
that a producer of corporate documents may incriminate herself by 
91. See, e.g., notes 50-51 supra and accompanying text; see also Arenella, supra note SO, at 
42-43 (testimonial communication includes the intent to communicate). 
92. See notes 42-49 supra and accompanying text. 
93. See notes 70-73 supra and accompanying text. 
94. See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 429 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("I know of no Fifth Amendment 
principle which makes the testimonial nature of evidence and, therefore, one's protection against 
incriminating himself, tum on the strength of the Government's case against him."); cf. Heidt, 
supra note 14, at 476 n.151. 
95. Morganstern, 771 F.2d at 148 (quoted in note 86 supra); see also, 771 F.2d at 149 (Jones, 
J., dissenting) ("[T]he majority distorts the rationale of Doe by promulgating a rule that the act 
of producing corporate documents is always free of testimonial implications."). 
96. See 425 U.S. at 410 (quoted in text accompanying note 58 supra). Arguably, one could 
interpret Justice White's statement that testimonial sufficiency "may depend on the facts and 
circumstances of particular cases or classes thereof" (emphasis added) to allow for a blanket rule 
for all corporate records producers. However, no court has adopted this position, and the facts 
and circumstances of cases in which persons are compelled to produce corporate records are too 
diverse to be treated as a class. Several lower courts properly determine an admission's testimo-
nial sufficiency and its incriminating potential separately. See, e.g., United States v. Plesons, 560 
F.2d 890, 892-93 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 966 (1977); see also Morganstern, 771 F.2d at 
149 (Jones, J., dissenting) ("[W]hether a particular act of production is testimonial is a question 
of fact to be determined by the district court at the time the custodian of documents contests a 
subpoena for their production.") (emphasis added). 
Finally, it may not be appropriate to determine the testimonial sufficiency of all three produc-
tion admissions in the same way. While existence and possession are not sufficiently testimonial 
if each is a "foregone conclusion,'' Fisher and Doe left open the possibility that the authentication 
admission may be testimonial even if it is a "foregone conclusion." See note 59 supra. 
97. See notes 71-72 supra and accompanying text. 
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admitting that she knows the documents exist, that she possesses 
them, and that she thinks they are the ones the subpoena described, 
despite Fisher's suggestion in dicta to the contrary.98 
It is difficult to articulate a test for what is considered a "foregone 
conclusion" because the inquiry turns on the unique facts of each 
case.99 Several courts, including the Supreme Court in Doe, have held 
that the existence or possession of documents of a sole proprietor or 
individual were sufficiently unknown to the government to deserve the 
protection of the fifth amendment. 100 Some courts examining the 
same question when corporate documents are involved have also held 
that existence and possession are not foregone conclusions. For exam-
ple, in In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Katz), 101 Katz was subpoenaed 
to produce documents of businesses co-owned or controlled by his cli-
ent, who sought to intervene to bring a motion to quash. 102 The Sec-
ond Circuit noted that "the Government obviously does not know the 
identity of [the client's] corporations or [Katz's] relationship to them 
•••• " 103 For these entities, the court said, "the 'existence and location 
of the papers' is not a 'foregone conclusion,' and their production may 
well add much 'to the sum total of the Government's informa-
tion.' " 104 The government may sometimes use subpoenas duces te-
98. See note 88 supra and accompanying text. 
99. See, e.g., United States v. Lang, 792 F.2d 1235, 1241 (4th Cir. 1986) ("Lang's act of 
producing those records would add little or nothing to the sum total of the government's knowl-
edge of the existence and location of the summoned records."); United States v. Fox, 721 F.2d 
32, 37-38 (2d Cir. 1983) (Before production can be compelled, the government must demonstrate 
that it "knows enough to eliminate any possibility that ... production would constitute an in-
criminating testimonial act."); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Nov. 13, 1984 
(Doe), 616 F. Supp. 1159, 1161(E.D.N.Y.1985) (Production is not incriminating "[i]fthe gov-
ernment can demonstrate with reasonable particularity that it knows of the existence and loca-
tion of subpoenaed documents .... "). 
100. See, e.g., Doe, 465 U.S. at 614 n.13; Butcher v. Bailey, 753 F.2d 465, 469 (6th Cir.), cert 
dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 17 (1985); In re Grand Jury Proceedings on Feb. 4, 1982, 759 F.2d 1418, 
1421 (9th Cir. 1985); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Served Upon John Doe, 466 F. 
Supp. 325, 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); see also Casenote, United States v. Fox: The Fifth Amendment 
Shields a Sole Proprieter [sic]from Producing Business Records Pursuant to an IRS Summons, 38 
ARK. L. REv. 670, 681-84 (1985) (discussing what burden government must meet to demon-
strate its awareness of records location and existence). Following Fisher's lead, many courts 
separate this inquiry into two tests, one for determining whether the admissions of existence and 
possession are incriminating and another for determining whether the admission of authenticity 
is incriminating. See, e.g., United States v. Fox, 721 F.2d 32, 36-37 (2d Cir. 1983). 
101. 623 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1980). 
102. 623 F.2d at 123-24. 
103. 623 F.2d at 126. 
104. 623 F.2d at 126 (quoting Fisher, 425 U.S. at 411); see also Municipal Investigating 
Comm., 200 N.J. Super. 413, 421, 491 A.2d 779, 783 (1984) (existence and location of police 
records not foregone conclusion); Note, Organizational Papers, supra note 8, at 646 n.54 (sug-
gesting case in which existence of documents would be unknown to government); cf In re Grand 
Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated June 13, 1983 and June 22, 1983, 722 F.2d 981, 987 (2d Cir. 
1983) (production might corroborate that witness misappropriated records). In most cases, how-
ever, existence and possession are held to be foregone conclusions. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury 
Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Nov. 13, 1984 (Doe), 616 F. Supp. 1159, 1160-61 (E.D.N.Y. 
1985) (admission of existence and location of records is not incriminating where subpoena was , 
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cum in these situations because other methods of obtaining documents 
are unavailable, as when the documents cannot be described with par-
ticularity or their location or custodian is unknown.105 Thus, the inci-
dence of persons incriminating themselves through production of 
corporate documents may be higher than Fisher suggests. 
Similarly, a corporate record producer's admission that she thinks 
the documents she produces are the ones described by the subpoena 
may also be incriminating. Fisher reasoned that this authenticity ad-
mission is not incriminating if the gove~ent cannot use it to authen-
ticate the documents at trial. 106 However, a requirement that an 
admission be adequate to authenticate documents at trial in order to 
be incriminating ignores the possibility that the government can use 
admissions of authenticity to incriminate a person in other ways. For 
instance, evidence that a person is familiar enough with documents to 
identify them may allow a fact finder to infer that the person was fa-
miliar with their contents.107 The admission also may lend credibility 
to documents in the grand jury setting where evidentiary requirements 
for authenticity are absent.1os 
The Court compounded the inadequacy of Fisher's measure for in-
for records including cash receipts and disbursements, general ledgers, cancelled checks, bank 
statements, and tax returns, where government affidavit showed the government knew witness 
kept a set of partnership books, knew of two bank accounts, and knew the names on those 
accounts). 
105. See United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 608 n.3 (1984) (subpoenas may be overbroad); 
465 U.S. at 613 n.12 (quoting lower court inferring that government attempted to compensate for 
lack of knowledge by requiring appellee to become the primary informant against himself); 
United States v. Fox, 721 F.2d 32, 38 (2d Cir. 1983); Heidt, supra note 14, at 488 (government 
often cannot describe documents in detail needed to obtain search warrant); Note, supra note 66, 
at 685 n.23 (subpoena duces tecum only alternative when government is unsure of location or 
existence of evidence); Note, On Claiming the Fifth Amendment for Mixed Purpose Documents: 
The Problem of Categorizing Documents as Personal or Corporate in a Business Setting, 17 U.S.F. 
L. REv. 333, 343-44 (1983); White Collar Crime, supra note 68, at 573 n.2475; see also In re 
Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Nov. 13, 1984 (Doe), 616 F. Supp. 1159, 1161 
(E.D.N.Y. 1985) ("A blunderbuss subpoena, such as that issued here, creates an inference that 
the government is seeking to compensate for its lack of knowledge by compelling petitioner 'to 
become the primary informant against himself.' " The inference was rebutted by a government 
affidavit demonstrating that the government already knew the information admitted.) (quoting 
United States v. Fox, 721 F.2d 32, 38 (2d Cir. 1983)); note 158 infra. But see Andresen v. 
Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 479-82 (1976) (search warrant for documents held valid even though 
warrant contained phrase "fruits, instrumentalities and evidence of crime at this [time] un-
known"); K. MANN, DEFENDING WHITE COLLAR CRIME 275 n.30 (1985); Wilson & Matz, 
Obtaining Evidence for Federal Economic Crime Prosecutions: An Overview and Analysis of Inves-
tigative Methods, 14 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 651, 690-91 (1977). 
106. 425 U.S. at 412-13. Justice White reasoned that since the taxpayer did not prepare the 
subpoenaed papers, he could not authenticate them, and therefore his admission that he thought 
they were authentic would not represent a substantial threat of incrimination. See also Butcher 
v. Bailey, 753 F.2d 465, 470 (6th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 17 (1985). 
107. Heidt, supra note 14, at 478. 
108. See Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363 (1956) (grand jury indictment may not 
be challenged on the ground that there was inadequate or incompetent evidence); see also 2 W. 
LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 14, at§ 14.4(a) (evidentiary standards for preliminary hearings 
vary from state to state). 
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crimination in Doe, where it held that the admission of authenticity is 
not incriminating if authentication is a foregone conclusion (that is, if 
authenticity is provable by other means). 109 Several lower courts have 
interpreted Fisher and Doe to mean that if there is any way to authen-
ticate the documents other than using the admissions of the producer, 
then the admission of authenticity is not incriminating.110 As there 
are almost always alternative ways to authenticate entity docu-
ments, 111 a self-incrimination claim for the admission of authenticity 
will usually fail any test that requires the admission to be the sole 
means of authentication available to the government. However, the 
privilege should still be available for those situations in which the gov-
ernment is unable to demonstrate that authenticity, existence, and pos-
session are all foregone conclusions. 
B. The Entity Rule Does Not Preclude the Act-of-Production 
Privilege for Producing Corporate Documents 
Interpreting Fisher and Doe to mean that production of corporate 
records is neither testimonial nor incriminating is not the only ration-
109. 465 U.S. at 614 n.13. Doe's adoption of the foregone conclusion language for all three 
admissions is a departure from Fisher and unjustifiably narrows the fifth amendment's protection 
against compelled testimonial incrimination. Just because a prosecutor may use some other 
method to authenticate the documents instead of a target's testimony does not mean the prosecu-
tor will use it. See Note, Organizational Papers, supra note 8, at 647 n.56 (suggesting that evi-
dence authenticated by a defendant is more influential than evidence authenticated by a third 
party). Until the witness receives a guarantee that the prosecutor will not use his testimony 
against him, it is incriminating. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings (United States), 626 F.2d 
1051, 1056-57 (1st Cir. 1980) ("[I]fthe government can use the compelled obedience to prove an 
incriminating fact, or to discover other incriminating evidence, the party's constitutional right 
remains in jeopardy.") (emphasis in original). The appropriate response to the presence of alter-
native means of authentication is not to pronounce that the producer's authenticating admission 
is not incriminating, but to require the prosecutor to grant the producer use immunity for that 
admission. See notes 131-32 infra and accompanying text. Granting immunity would not de-
prive the government of much evidence in the situation where existence and possession and au-
thenticity are foregone conclusions because the government already has other means to introduce 
this evidence against the witness. 
110. See United States v. Lang, 792 F.2d 1235, 1241 (4th Cir. 1986) ("[B]ecause Agent Camp 
can identify the records, the Government need not rely on Lang's act to verify that the docu-
ments are in fact what they purport to be."); United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1041 (5th 
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 862 (1982) (fifth amendment not a ground for refusing to pro-
duce documents as long as the fact of compliance with the summons is not introduced into 
evidence at the incriminated party's trial); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Nov. 
13, 1984 (Doe), 616 F. Supp. 1159, 1161-62 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (When the government can authen-
ticate documents without relying on any act by petitioner, then production by petitioner does not 
implicate the fifth amendment. The court held that admissions involved in the production of 
cancelled checks and bank statements are not incriminating since the documents are either self-
authenticating or can be authenticated through testimony of bank personnel.); United States v. 
Beckman, 545 F. Supp. 1284, 1285 (M.D. Fla. 1982) (admission "does not implicate the Fifth 
Amendment unless it is the act of production itself which is to be used as incriminating evi-
dence") (citing United States v. MacKey, 647 F.2d 898, 900 (9th Cir. 1981)); see also note 109 
supra; In re Special Investigation No. 281, 299 Md. 181, 195, 473 A.2d 1, 8 (1984) (stating that 
because others "are in a position to verify the records" the production "does not constitute com-
pelled testimonial incrimination"); Note, supra note 66, at 689. 
111. See notes 130-58 infra and accompanying text. 
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ale lower courts have employed to deny the privilege against self-in-
crimination to persons compelled to produce corporate records. Many 
courts have reasoned that the entity rule precludes applying the 
Fisher-Doe test to claims by producers of corporate records. These 
courts point to language in Doe and Fisher which they claim indicates 
that the Court did not intend to reverse its prior denial of fifth amend-
ment protection for entity records producers.112 In light of the 
Court's recent shift to compelled testimonial incrimination as the 
guide for determining the scope of fifth amendment protection, how-
ever, the principles behind the entity doctrine no longer justify with-
holding fifth amendment protection for testimony implicit in the act of 
producing corporate documents.113 
The Court extended the rule precluding self-incrimination claims 
for producing entity documents from entities themselves to agents of 
entities for three reasons. Agents have been denied the right to refuse 
to produce entity documents that incriminate them because: (1) entity 
records are not private enough to deserve fifth amendment protec-
tion; 114 (2) such a privilege would undermine the government's efforts 
to enforce the law against both entities and their agents; 115 and (3) an 
entity agent, upon accepting his agency, waives his fifth amendment 
privilege to refuse to produce documents. 116 None of these reasons 
justifies denying an agent his right to assert the fifth amendment privi-
lege when a subpoena compels him to incriminate himself through tes-
timony implicit in the act of producing records. 
112. The Sixth Circuit in In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Morganstem) cites several passages 
in Fisher and Doe that suggest the Court "did not retreat from the collective entity rule" and 
argues that neither case undercut the vitality of the rule. 771 F.2d 143, 145-46 (6th Cir.) (en 
bane), cerL denied, 106 S. Ct. 594 (1985) (citing Fisher, 425 U.S. at 411-13, quoted in text accom-
panying note 57 supra). In its discussion of Doe, the court stated: 
Nowhere in the Doe opinion is it even hinted that it announces a departure from the collec-
tive entity rule. Rather the opinion points out that the Court of Appeals in Doe noted that 
an individual may not assert the fifth amendment privilege on behalf of a corporation, part-
nership, or other collective entity, citing Bellis with apparent approval. 
771 F.2d at 147; see also In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Vargas), 727 F.2d 941, 946 (10th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 90 (1984); Note, Privilege After Fisher and Doe, supra note 8, at 946-47 
(arguing that Fisher and Doe assumed the continued validity of denying corporate agents a privi-
lege to avoid producing corporate documents under the collective entity rule). Other courts have 
also denied the privilege to producers of corporate records stating both that the entity rule still 
applies and that production of corporate documents is not incriminating testimony. See, e.g., 111 
re Rubin, 100 A.D.2d 850, 852, 474 N.Y.S.2d 94, 96 (1984). But see note 84 supra. 
113. See Saltzburg, The Required Records Doctrine: Its Lessons for the Privilege Against Se/f-
Incrimination, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 6, 41 n.184 (1986); Note, Organizational Papers, supra note 8. 
114. See Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 92; Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 122· 
23 (1957); United States v. Beattie, 522 F.2d 267, 273 (2d Cir. 1975); Gerstein, supra note 74, at 
365-66. 
115. See note 123 infra. 
116. See notes 164-67 infra and accompanying text. 
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1. A Fundamental Shift in Fifth Amendment Analysis; Eliminating 
Protection for Private Documents 
The Court's fifth amendment analysis regarding the production of 
documents no longer depends on how private those documents are. 
The Court first extended the fifth amendment privilege to compelled 
production of private papers in Boyd v. United States. 117 The early 
decisions denying this fifth amendment privilege to entity agents rea-
soned that since the records of an organization are subject to inspec-
tion by others in the organization and by the state, they "do not 
contain the requisite element of privacy or confidentiality essential for 
the privilege to attach."118 Alternatively, because the records were not 
an agent's personal property, but instead belonged to the entity, the 
agent could not assert his fifth amendment privilege to avoid their pro-
duction.119 Records of individuals and sole proprietors remained pro-
tected because they were private papers owned by natural persons.120 
Fisher and Doe rendered privacy and ownership irrelevant to anal-
ysis of self-incrimination claims. Under Fisher and Doe, because any 
testimony contained within voluntarily created papers is not com-
pelled, there is no longer any need to distinguish between private doc-
uments and entity documents in order to determine which are 
privileged - none are. 121 Fifth amendment protection in cases of doc-
117. 116 U.S. 616 (l886);see also Bellis, 417 U.S. at 91; Murphy v. Waterfront Commn., 378 
U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (listing respect for a "private enclave" as one of several principles behind the 
fifth amendment privilege). See generally Bradley, Constitutional Protection for Private Papers, 
16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 461 (1981). 
118. Bellis, 417 U.S. at 92; see also Comment, Fifth Amendment Interpretation in Recent Tax 
Record Production Cases, 46 U. CIN. L. REv. 232, 234 (1977) ("[In Wilson, White, and Bellis] the 
Court considered the personal and private nature of the documents to be the primary determi-
nant for deciding whether the privilege against self-incrimination would attach."). 
119. See Bellis, 417 U.S. at 93, 98-99; Note, Organizational Papers, supra note 8, at 642-43; 
Note, Formalism, Legal Realism, and Constitutionally Protected Privacy Under the Fourth and 
Fifth Amendments, 90 HARV. L. REV. 945, 951-64 (1977). For a recent example of a court 
applying this reasoning to a corporate records producer, see People ex rel Clancy v. Superior 
Court (Ebel), 39 Cal. 3d 740, 744-45, 705 P.2d 347, 349-58, 218 Cal. Rptr. 24, 26-27 (1985). 
120. See Bellis, 417 U.S. at 87-90; United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698-700 (1944); 
Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 490 (1913); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377 
(1911). See generally Note, Organizational Papers, supra note 8, at 643; note 121 infra and arti-
cles cited therein. 
121. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 618 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see, e.g., In re Kave, 760 F.2d 343, 
355 (1st Cir. 1985); Morganstern, 771 F.2d at 148 (Jones, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court in Doe did 
not consider the content of the documents ... or whether their ownership was private or collec-
tive."); State v. Superior Court of Maricopa County, 128 Ariz. 253, 256, 625 P.2d 316, 319 
(1981) (interpreting Fisher as rejecting privacy rationale for fifth amendment); 1 W. LAFAVE & 
J. ISRAEL, supra note 14, at§ 8.7(a) (Boyd "has little current vitality."); Gerstein, supra note 74; 
Heidt, supra note 14, at 441 n.5, 473; The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARV. L. REV. 56, 76-
78 (1976) (privacy rationale abolished by Fisher); Note, The Life and Times of Boyd v. United 
States (1886-1976), 76 MICH. L. REv. 184 (1977); White Collar Crime, supra note 68, at 565-66 
(concluding that Doe has left Boyd in "limbo"); see also Cramer, supra note 19, at 381 n.73 
(citing ten cases which hold that the focus of the fifth amendment is on the act of production); 
Note, Organizational Papers, supra note 8, at 643-44 (Fisher replaced Boyd's privacy standard 
with a compelled testimony standard); cf. Levinson, Testimonial Privileges and the Preferences of 
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ument production remains, but only for the act of production, not for 
the documents themselves.122 
2. Preventing Agents from Shielding the Corporation 
Another fundamental reason for prohibiting an individual from as-
serting her personal privilege against self-incrimination when produc-
ing corporate documents is to prevent individuals from using their 
personal constitutional rights to shield the records of entities from 
government inspection.123 Authorities must be able to bring criminal 
and civil enforcement proceedings against corporations and corporate 
Friendship, 1984 DUKE L.J. 631, 638-39 (extent of fifth amendment's privacy orientations should 
not be over-emphasized). 
But see Doe, 465 U.S. at 619 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("I continue to believe that under the 
Fifth Amendment 'there are certain documents no person ought to be compelled to produce at 
the government's request.'") (quoting Fisher, 425 U.S. at 431-32 (Marshall, J., concurring in 
judgment)); Fisher, 425 U.S. at 414-28 (Brennan, J., concurring); United States v. (Under Seal), 
745 F.2d 834 (4th Cir. 1984), vacated as moot, 105 S. Ct. 1861 (1985); In re Grand Jury Proceed-
ings (United States), 626 F.2d 1051, 1054 n.2 (1st Cir. 1980); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 
Special Grand Jury No. II, Sept. Term, 1983, 600 F. Supp. 436, 438 (D. Md. 1984); White Collar 
Crime, supra note 68, at 567 n.2407 Qisting post-Doe cases that still distinguish between private 
and nonprivate documents); Cramer, supra note 19, at 382 nn.74, 76 (listing cases prior to Doe 
but subsequent to Fisher that applied Boyd's privacy rationale). 
122. The concurring judge in In re Grand Jury Matter (Brown) observed: 
Fisher and Doe have changed the fifth amendment landscape by refocusing the inquiry on 
the act of production and not on the nature of the documents at issue. The pre-Fisher cases 
distinguished between corporate documents, which were afforded no fifth amendment pro-
tection, and other business records, which were held to be protected by the fifth amendment. 
In Fisher and Doe, however, the Court held that voluntarily prepared business records of 
any kind are not entitled to fifth amendment protection, and that only the act of producing 
the documents might be privileged ...• Thus, one basis for the pre-Fisher distinction be-
tween corporate and other records-keepers - that only the latter were keepers of records 
with fifth amendment protection - was eroded by these later cases. 
768 F.2d 525, 530 n.3 (3d Cir. 1985) (en bane) (Becker, J., concurring) (emphasis in original) 
(citations omitted); see also Saltzberg, supra note 113, at 40-41 (arguing Andresen, Fisher, and 
Doe suggest that it is "time to reexamine the holding in Wilson that a corporate officer may not 
invoke the privilege to resist the subpoena of corporate documents tending to incriminate him"). 
But see In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Morganstem), 771 F.2d 143, 145 (6th Cir.) (en bane), 
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 594 (1985) ("Despite this shift in emphasis from the contents of subpoe-
naed documents to the testimonial act of production, the Court did not retreat from the collec-
tive entity rule."). See generally Note, Organizational Papers, supra note 8, at 640-48. 
123. In United States v. White, the Court stated: 
The reason underlying the restriction of this constitutional privilege to natural individuals 
acting in their own private capacity is clear. The scope and nature of the economic activities 
of ... organizations and their representatives demand that the constitutional power of •• , 
governments to regulate those activities be correspondingly effective. . • • [E]vidence of 
wrongdoing by an organization or its representatives is usually to be found in the official 
records and documents of that organization. Were the cloak of the privilege to be thrown 
around these impersonal records and documents, effective enforcement of many federal and 
state laws would be impossible. . •• The framers of the constitutional guarantee against 
compulsory self-disclosure, who were interested primarily in protecting individual civil lib-
erties, cannot be said to have intended the privilege to be available to protect economic or 
other interests of such organizations so as to nullify appropriate governmental regulations. 
322 U.S. at 700 (citations omitted). See also Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 384-85 (1911) 
("The reserved power of visitation would seriously be embarrassed, if not wholly defeated in its 
effective exercise, if guilty officers could refuse inspection of records and papers of the corpora-
tion."); Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 90 (1974); Meltzer, Required Records, the McCarran 
Act, and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 18 U. CHI. L. REV. 687, 702-03 (1951); 
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agents who violate federal and state law.124 The government builds 
most of these cases with documentary evidence.125 Proof of offenses 
such as fraud, tax, securities, and antitrust violations is virtually al-
ways contained within financial records, correspondence, client or ac-
count files, written policies, meeting minutes, internal memos, and 
other corporate documents. The papers themselves, however, are not 
sufficient proof of an offense if the government takes a case to trial. 
Because evidentiary rules require documentary evidence to be authen-
ticated for admission at trial, the government's attorneys may need 
authenticating evidence in addition to the records themselves. 126 
Applying the Fisher-Doe act-of-production privilege to producers 
of corporate records would not significantly limit the government's ac-
cess to or use of corporate documents against a corporation and its 
agents. The government can almost always obtain and authenticate 
entity documents without using the compelled and incriminating act-
of-production testimony of a corporate representative. This section 
explains how the act-of-production privilege for producers of corpo-
rate records would still allow the government to use corporate docu-
ments against corporations and their agents in most situations. 
Assume a case in which a federal grand jury is investigating a cor-
Saltzburg, supra note 113, at 37; cf Note, Books and Records Privilege, supra note 14, at 74 n.21 
(citing cases reinforcing the view that corporations cannot assert the fifth amendment privilege). 
The question of whether ease of law enforcement should be relevant at all in interpreting the 
fifth amendment is not settled. See, e.g., United States v. Fox, 721 F.2d 32, 40 n.6 (2d Cir. 1983) 
("Our decision today should not severely hamper the legitimate investigatory activities of the 
IRS. . . . [W]e do not believe that effective enforcement of the tax laws should take precedence 
over constitutional protections."); Gerstein, supra note 74, at 368 (balancing of the interest oflaw 
enforcement not appropriate in fifth amendment doctrine, unlike fourth amendment analysis); 
Note, Books and Records Privilege, supra note 14, at 79 ("[I]t was [the] very recognition of the 
demands of the government's regulatory interests that engendered the fifth amendment. Indeed, 
the privilege was formulated for the express purpose of providing the greatest amount of individ-
ual protection when government interests in having disclosure were correspondingly great."); 
Note, Organizational Papers, supra note 8, at 652-54 (the needs of law enforcement should be 
irrelevant in determining whether producers of corporate records are protected by the fifth 
amendment). 
124. See 1 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 14, at§ 8.12 n.124; cf Note, Organizational 
Papers, supra note 104, at 649 nn.64-65 (collecting support and criticism of the necessity of prose-
cuting individual officers in order to control organized crime). 
125. Wigmore wrote: 
Often the criminal acts of groups - especially of corporations, which virtually can act by 
written record only - are contained in writings only. They are virtually the sole evidential 
incriminating material upon which a prosecutor can rely. A rule privileging the group's 
records from surrender would impose upon the prosecutor a task largely futile. 
8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 14, at § 2259a. In a civil investigation of a corporation and its agents 
for tax evasion, an agency may compel the production of corporate documents through the use of 
an agency summons. A grand jury conducting a criminal investigation may issue a subpoena 
duces tecum for corporate records to obtain evidence needed to indict. See generally Wilson & 
Matz, Obtaining Evidence for Federal Economic Crime Prosecutions: An Overview and Analysis of 
Investigatory Methods, 14 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 651 (1977). 
126. For a discussion of fifth amendment issues raised in the context of authenticating 
records, see notes 151-57 infra and accompanying text; see also note 52 supra and accompanying 
text. 
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poration for fraud. Assume also that the grand jury issues a subpoena 
duces tecum to the president of the corporation ordering her to pro-
duce several corporate documents. Fisher and Doe hold that the presi-
dent may not object to production of documents on the basis that the 
contents of the documents incriminate her, because any testimony 
within the records' contents is not compelled. 127 Consequently, even if 
the papers contain information incriminating the president, she cannot 
prevent their disclosure. She can, instead, claim that the government 
cannot compel her to produce the records if the admissions she would 
make by producing the records might incriminate her personally. 128 
She may assert her act-of-production privilege by moving to quash the 
subpoena or by appearing in front of the grand jury without the docu-
ments and then in court to argue that her claim of privilege is proper. 
If the court finds that the admissions implicit in production would not 
be sufficiently testimonial or incriminating, the president must pro-
duce the documents.129 
If the court finds the president's act of production is privileged, 
however, the prosecutor has a number of alternative methods of au-
thenticating the documents. First, assume that the corporation, not its 
president, is the target of the grand jury's investigation.130 The prose-
cutor could grant use immunity to the president for those testimonial 
admissions implicit in production that the district court found incrimi-
nating.131 As an immunized witness, she would have to produce the 
127. See notes 65-68 supra and accompanying text. 
128. See notes 52-53 supra and accompanying text. 
129. See text at notes 84-111 supra. 
130. "A 'target' is a person as to whom the prosecutor or the grand jury has substantial 
evidence linking him or her to the commission of a crime and who, in the judgment of the 
prosecutor, is a putative defendant." U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATIORNEYS' 
MANUAL, 9-11.260 (1985). 
131. See, e.g., Rogers Transp., Inc. v. Stem, 763 F.2d 165 (3d Cir. 1985) (en bane) (the 
granting of use immunity to two employees of a single stockholder corporation allowed docu-
ment production without risk of testimonial self-incrimination); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas 
Duces Tecum Dated June 13, 1983 and June 22, 1983, 722 F.2d 981, 988 (2d Cir. 1983) (govern-
ment may immunize the act of production); State v. Wellington Precious Metals, Inc., 487 So. 2d 
326, 328 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (Pearson J., specially concurring) (same). 
A United States Attorney may grant use immunity to a witness who "has refused or is likely 
to refuse to testify or provide information on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination." 
18 U.S.C. § 6003(b)(2) (1982). Use immunity means that the government may not use the im-
munized testimony against the witness in any subsequent prosecution, and that the witness must 
testify under threat of contempt. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972). The Inter-
nal Revenue Service may also grant immunity. 18 U.S.C. § 6004 (1982). Without formal statu· 
tory immunity, the promise of a prosecutor or a court not to use a witness's testimony against her 
is constitutionally insufficient to compel her testimony. See United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 
616-17 (1984) (quoted at note 90 supra); Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 261-64 (1983); 
White Collar Crime, supra note 68, at 576-77 & n.2510 and cases cited therein. The Attorney 
General or his assistant·must approve each formal immunity grant. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE 
supra note 130 at 9-1.112Q. 
The immunity need only extend as far as the claim of privilege. For example, a record-keeper 
subpoenaed for company documents may only receive immunity from the government's use of 
the incriminating testimony implicit in production, not from the government's use of the con-
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records or risk being held in contempt of court. Because immunity 
would allow the prosecutor to use the immunized testimony against 
any defendant except the president, 132 the government could use both 
the contents of the records and the president's testimony against the 
corporation. The act-of-production privilege for producers of corpo-
rate records does not shield the corporation as long as there is some 
representative to produce the records to whom the prosecutor is will-
ing to grant immunity.133 
Assume another situation where both the president and the corpo-
ration are targets of the investigation. An act-of-production privilege 
for the president in an action against the corporation would not shield 
her from investigation or prosecution just as it does not shield the cor-
poration from prosecution. Applying Doe would only prevent the gov-
ernment from using the president's own admissions against her. The 
government may obtain and authenticate the documents in proceed-
ings against the president without using the president's own testi-
mony.134 First, the prosecutor could subpoena some other corporate 
agent who could produce and authenticate the documents and then 
use that agent's testimony against the president. Generally there will 
be someone whom the prosecutor is willing to subpoena who will not 
have a valid claim of self-incrimination for the act-of-production.135 
Even if the subpoenaed agent has a valid self-incrimination claim, a 
grant of use immunity will allow introduction of his testimony against 
the targeted president. 
tents of the documents. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 617 n.17; In re Grand Jury Proceedings (United 
States), 626 F.2d 1051, 1057-58 (1st Cir. 1980); United States v. Colletta, 602 F. Supp. 1322, 
1327 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (immunity protects authentication, not contents). See generally 1 W. 
LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 14, at§ 8.11; The Granting of Witness Immunity, 61 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 129 (1976). 
132. See note 131 supra. 
133. It is likely that immunity will be made available to some agent in the interests of prose-
cuting a more culpable target. See, e.g., U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROS-
ECUTION 39-41 (1980) (The U.S. Attorney should consider a person's relative culpability in 
connection with the offense or offenses being investigated or prosecuted and his history with 
respect to criminal activity.); see also Thornburgh, Reconciling Effective Federal Prosecution and 
the Fifth Amendment: "Criminal Coddling," "The New Torture," or "A Rationale Accommoda-
tion?," 67 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 155, 157 (1976) ("Federal prosecutors ... have em-
ployed the use immunity procedure to compel 'little fish' to convict the 'big fish' in scores of cases 
involving members of organized crime and racketeering syndicates, as well as corrupt politicans, 
and masterminds of white collar fraud.") (footnote omitted); Note, Organizational Papers, supra 
note 8, at 650 n.69 (citing prosecutors who do not think prosecution of organizations would 
"unduly suffer by extending the fifth amendment privilege to personally incriminating organiza-
tional documents"). But see U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, supra, at 38 (If time is critical, there may be 
cases in which the use of the immunity procedures would "unreasonably disrupt the presentation 
of evidence to the grand jury or the expeditious development of an investigation .... "). 
134. See In re Grand Jury Matter (Brown), 768 F.2d 525, 526 (3d Cir. 1985) (en bane) ("The 
government acknowledges that the grand jury could obtain the records by means other than a 
subpoena duces tecum addressed to Brown."); In re Grand Jury 83-8 (MIA) Subpoena Duces 
Tecum, 611 F. Supp. 16, 25 (S.D. Fla. 1985). 
135. See notes 109-11 supra and accompanying text. 
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Suppose our hypothetical is the rare136 case in which every repre-
sentative that the government could subpoena to produce the docu-
ments can and will claim his or her fifth amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination. Even if the prosecutor chooses not to grant immu-
nity to any of them, 137 the act-of-production privilege will not deprive 
the government of the use of the corporation's documents against the 
president. The prosecutor may direct a subpoena duces tecum to the 
corporation rather than to an individual associated with the corpora-
tion.138 An extension of Fisher and Doe to protect producers of corpo-
rate documents will not change the principle of Bellis that a 
corporation, no matter how small, has no fifth amendment rights to 
assert. The corporation has no privilege against self-incrimination,139 
and, therefore, cannot resist a subpoena and must find some way to 
comply.140 It must provide an agent who will produce and authenti-
cate the documents without asserting his fifth amendment privilege. 
Some courts have explicitly ordered a corporation to appoint an agent, 
other than the representative asserting his fifth amendment privilege, 
to produce documents. 141 As the Second Circuit explained in In re 
136. See Part II.A supra (not all act-of-production admissions are incriminating); note 145 
infra and accompanying text. 
137. Unless every agent is a target, it is unlikely that a prosecutor would decline to immunize 
at least one of them. See note 133 supra. 
138. See, e.g., Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 374 (1911) where the Court stated: 
"Where the documents of a corporation are sought the practice has been to subpoena the officer 
who has them in his custody. But there would seem to be no reason why the subpoena duces 
tecum should not be directed to the corporation itself." See also Brown, 768 F.2d at 528 
("Records of collective entities still must be maintained, and their production can be compelled 
by a subpoena duces tecum addressed to the entity."); cf In re Grand Jury Empanelled Feb. 14, 
1978 (United States), 597 F.2d 851, 854 (3d Cir. 1978), ajfd. in part and revd. in part sub nom. 
United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984) (subpoena directed to "any responsible officer" of the 
corporation); People v. Modem Amusement Co., 72 Misc. 2d 950, 952, 340 N.Y.S.2d 748, 751 
(1973) (writ may be directed to corporation itself). But see Note, Organizational Papers, supra 
note 8, at 649 n.67 (ability to obtain documents by subpoena to entity still an "open question," 
citing no authority). 
A court may provide similar relief by ordering the entity to produce and authenticate the 
records. See, e.g., In re Two Grand Jury Subpoenae Duces Tecum, 769 F.2d 52, 55, 57 (2d Cir. 
1985). 
139. See notes 17-19, 23-33 supra and accompanying text. 
140. See Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 376 (1911) (a command to a corporation is a 
command to those officially responsible to conduct affairs); In re Two Grand Jury Subpoenae 
Duces Tecum, 769 F.2d 52, 57 (2d Cir. 1985) (stating that there is no situation in which the fifth 
amendment would prevent a corporation from producing records); United States v. G & G Ad-
vertising Co., 762 F.2d 632 (8th Cir. 1985), (corporate documents must be produced in response 
to summons addressed to corporation); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Issued to 13 Corps., 775 
F.2d 43, 46-47 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1459 (1986) (subpoenae issued to "corpora-
tion, not Roe, do not mention him or demand that Roe himself produce them"); United States v. 
Barth, 745 F.2d 184, 189 (2d Cir. 1984) (a corporation may be required to supply a new agent 
should all employees refuse to testify on fifth amendment grounds), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 1004 
(1985). 
141. See In re Two Grand Jury Subpoenae Duces Tecum, 769 F.2d 52, 54, 59-60 (2d Cir. 
1985); United States v. Barth, 745 F.2d 184, 186, 188-89 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 
1004 (1985); Glanzer, supra note 53, at 527; see also In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Issued to 13 
Corps., 775 F.2d 43, 48 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1459 (1986) (state law, and 
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Two Grand Jury Subpoenae Duces Tecum, 142 a court may order the 
corporation to appoint "an entirely new agent who has no previous 
connection with the corporation that might place him in a position 
where his testimonial act of production would be self-
incriminating." 143 
The idea that a corporation may be required to provide a person 
who cannot or will not invoke his privilege against self-incrimination 
is not new. Courts have required corporations to use their broad cor-
porate powers to provide an agent who could, without fear of self-
incrimination, furnish answers to interrogatories.144 In most circum-
stances, corporations will have agents who can provide the act-of-pro-
duction testimony without the risk of self-incrimination.145 Even in a 
one-person corporation, the corporation's attorney may be an appro-
priate agent for production.146 In the unusual case where the corpora-
tion has no employee, attorney or accountant for whom the three 
admissions implicit in production are foregone conclusions, the entity 
could appoint somebody off the street, so to speak, to be a corporate 
agent to produce and authenticate the documents.141 
possibly federal law, empowers corporations to make such appointments or district court may 
order them to do so); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum Served Upon 22nd Ave. Drugs, 
Inc., 633 F. Supp. 419, 423 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (avoiding issue of whether Doe applies to custodians 
of corporate records by ordering corporations to secure representatives who will produce the 
subpoenaed documents within ten days); State v. Wellington Precious Metals, Inc., 487 So. 2d 
326, 328 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (Pearson, J., specially concurring) (suggesting using an "ap-
pointed surrogate method" of appointing producer in lieu of custodian). But see United States v. 
Hankins, 565 F.2d 1344, 1350 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 909 (1979) (court cannot 
order agent to produce some employee of the firm as a witness who will not claim privilege, and 
agent cannot compel such witness' attendance or waiver of fifth amendment privilege). 
142. 769 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1985). 
143. 769 F.2d at 57 (2d Cir. 1985); see also United States v. Sancetta, 788 F.2d 67, 74-75 (2d 
Cir. 1986) ("another agent could be appointed by Sancetta Corp. or by the court to produce the 
records"). 
144. See United States v. 3963 Bottles, More or Less, Enerjol Double Strength, 265 F.2d 332, 
336 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 931 (1959) (corporation has no fifth amendment rights and 
has a "duty to appoint an agent who could, without fear of self-incrimination, furnish such re-
quested information as [is] available to the corporation"); Apache Corp. v. McKeen, 529 F. 
Supp. 459, 463 (W.D.N.Y. 1982); Priebe v. World Ventures, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 1244, 1246 (C.D. 
Cal. 1976); see also United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 8 (1970) (while recognizing a corpora-
tion's obligation to appoint an agent, the court does not address circumstances where the corpo-
ration could not appoint an agent who would waive his right against self-incrimination). See 
generally Cooper, Fifth Amendment Rights in Private Treble Damage Litigation, 48 ANTITRusr 
L.J. 1381, 1393-94 (1979). 
145. See In re Grand Jury Matter (Brown), 768 F.2d 525, 529 (3d Cir. 1985) (en bane); see 
also United States v. Lang, 792 F.2d 1235, 1240-42 (4th Cir. 1986) (characterizing situations in 
which the admissions of one who produces corporate documents are testimonial and incriminat-
ing as "rare," "limited," "unusual," and "narrow"); cf 8 c. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2018 at 143-44 (1970) (unlikely that a corporation would not be 
able to appoint someone who would not subject himself to the risks of self-incrimination in an-
swering interrogatories). 
146. See Brown, 768 F.2d at 256 (Brown had offered to submit the records to the grand jury 
through his attorney. The offer was rejected by the government.). 
147. See In re Two Grand Jury Subpoenae Duces Tecum, 769 F.2d 52, 57 (2d Cir. 1985); 8 J. 
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Requiring an entity that receives a subpoena to appoint an agent 
who will not be incriminated by production would not allow entity 
agents to subvert government enforcement efforts. Assume the case of 
a subpoena addressed to a professional corporation consisting of one 
person with no agents. If the professional appoints an agent to pro-
duce her documents, the agent, without a fifth amendment claim of his 
own, may be forced to testify from whom he got the records and what 
that person said to him in order to authenticate the records. Some 
argue that, in effect, the professional has been compelled to testify 
against herself through the agent. 148 If so, the argument continues, a 
one-person corporation may effectively shield its records through the 
individual's act-of-production privilege. This conclusion is erroneous, 
however, under Bellis 149 and the other entity cases. There is no com-
pulsion for the individual professional to testify because the subpoena 
compelled the corporation, not a particular agent, to act.150 
Another criticism is that a corporation might be unable to supply 
an agent capable of authenticating the documents who is not also a 
potential target. 151 Assume that the only agent the corporation can 
find to produce the records without self-incrimination has very little 
personal knowledge of the business. The corporation's personnel must 
WIGMORE, supra note 14, at § 2259c n.16 ("By directing a subpoena to the organization, [the 
government] puts it under a duty to obtain the records, its property, from the incriminated custo· 
dian and to have them turned over to the court by a representative who would not himself be 
incriminated."); see also In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Issued to 13 Corps., 775 F.2d 43, 47-48 (2d 
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1459 (1986) (dissolution of corporation does not eliminate the 
duty of a former corporation to appoint someone to produce subpoenaed records for whom the 
act of production would not be incriminating). 
148. See Heidt, supra note 70, at 1069 n.31 (forcing agent is like forcing the originally sub· 
poenaed employee because employee must inform agent about documents); Note, Privilege After 
Fisher and Doe, supra note 8, at 956; see also Rogers Transp., Inc. v. Stem, 763 F.2d 165, 167 
(3d Cir. 1985) (en bane) (not deciding on the merits of appellant's argument that a court order 
directing the company to designate a third party to produce the summoned records is, in reality, 
equivalent to compelling appellant to do the same, "since [appellant] is the only individual who 
can appoint and apprise any such agent of these matters"). But see In re Grand Jury Subpoenas 
Issued to 13 Corps., 775 F.2d 43, 48 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1459 (1986) (court 
rejects witness' claim that he would incriminate himself if ordered to appoint an agent because he 
has to inform that agent that the records were authentic and those described, and that informa· 
tion could then be used against him). 
149. Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974). 
150. See, e.g., In re Two Grand Jury Subpoenae Duces Tecum, 769 F.2d 52, 59 (2d Cir. 
1985) ("The bright line of Bellis still holds. The appellant ... chose the corporate form in order 
to gain its attendant benefits; he cannot now disregard this form in order to shield its business 
records from production."); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Issued to 13 Corps., 775 F.2d 43, 48 
(2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1459 (1986), where the Second Circuit explained, 
If one of Roe's relatives or associates complies with the subpoena [to the corporation], any 
information [he or she] obtained from Roe would not have been extracted under an order 
requiring him to testify .... [W]e do not share Roe's view that appointment of an outsider 
would necessarily involve Roe in self-incrimination .••. [Roe] himself is not being required 
to testify through any personal act of production. 
151. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Matter (Brown), 768 F.2d 525, 536 (3d Cir. 1985) (en bane) 
(Garth, J., dissenting); United States v. Braswell, 436 F. Supp. 669, 674 n.5 (E.D.N.C. 1977); 
Note, Privilege After Fisher and Doe, supra note 8, at 956 nn.150-51. 
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inform the agent about the records so that the agent may authenticate 
the records he produces. To authenticate the documents, the govern-
ment must either prove authenticity with the nontarget's second-hand 
information and other evidence, or grant a target use immunity for his 
act-of-production testimony. 
Neither choice will seriously disadvantage government enforce-
ment efforts. Authenticating business documents is relatively easy. 
The Federal Rules of Evidence require only that the party who sub-
mits the evidence (in this case, the prosecutor) provide a foundation 
from which the fact finder could legitimately infer that the evidence is 
what the submitting party claims it to be. 152 A proponent of docu-
mentary evidence may satisfy this requirement by showing that the 
documents are self-authenticating, 153 offering evidence that the unique 
characteristics of the documents demonstrate they are authentic, 154 
proving authenticity through circumstantial evidence, 155 or offering 
testimony of a witness with personal knowledge of their authentic-
ity.156 If the agent producing the documents cannot testify to their 
152. FED. R. Evm. 90l(a), (b)(l) (testimony of a witness with knowledge that a matter is 
what it is claimed to be satisfies requirement of authentication); see also In re Japanese Elec. 
Prods., 723 F.2d 238, 286 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. granted in part sub nom. Matsushita Elec. Indus. 
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 105 S. Ct. 1863 (1985) (minutes sufficiently authenticated when pro-
duced by court order, counsel present when produced, removed from stack of similar minutes, 
and appearance, content, and substance of minutes appear authentic) (citing FED. R. Evm. 
901(b)(4)). See generally 5 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 'if 
901(b)(l)[Ol] (1983). 
153. See Brown, 768 F.2d at 529 (business records can usually be authenticated without re-
sort to extrinsic evidence); FED. R. Evm. 902(9) (checks are self-authenticating); In re Richter & 
Phillips Jewelers & Distrib., Inc., 31 B.R. 512, 514 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (original check is admissible 
without extrinsic evidence of authenticity under 902(9)). 
Also, FED. R. Evm. 902(10) provides that documents may be presumed authentic by statute. 
Such statutes include signature on tax return or SEC registration, 15 U.S.C. § 77(a) (1976), and 
records and receipts filed with particular agencies. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 412 (1976) (Federal 
Communications Commission), 49 U.S.C. § 16(13) (1976) (Interstate Commerce Commission), 
49 U.S.C. § 1503 (1976) (Civil Aeronautics Board). Section 2-205 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code provides that certain third-party documents are self-authenticating; see 5 J. WEINSTEIN & 
M. BERGER supra note 152, at 'if 902(9)[01], 902-38. 
154. See FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(4); 5 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER supra note 152, at 'if 
90l(b)(4)(01)-(04). 
155. See, e.g., United States v. Black, 767 F.2d 1334, 1341-42 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 
106 S. Ct. 574 (1985) (records authenticated by virtue of being in Black's possession at the time 
government sought production); Burgess v. Premier Corp., 727 F.2d 826, 835-36 (9th Cir. 1984) 
(exhibits adequately authenticated by being in the defendant's warehouse); United States v. Na-
tale, 526 F.2d 1160, 1173 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 950 (1976) ("Proof of the connec-
tion of an exhibit to the defendants may be made by circumstantial, as well as direct, evidence. 
The prosecution need only prove a rational basis from which the jury may conclude that the 
exhibit did, in fact, belong to the appellants."); cf Greenbaum v. United States, 80 F.2d 113, 124-
25 (9th Cir. 1935) (company's mailing of letter shown by evidence of receipt of a letter through 
the mail bearing the company's name and sent from a town in which the company operated); 
Conner v. Zanuzoski, 36 Wash. 2d 458, 464-65, 218 P.2d 879, 882-83 (1950) (when combined 
with some evidence that a letter was written and mailed, evidence that a reply letter was received 
is sufficient to authenticate the original letter). 
156. See, e.g., FED. R. Evm. 901(b)(l) (testimony that a matter is what it is claimed to be is 
sufficient authentication). 
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authenticity from his own personal knowledge, as in our hypothetical, 
the prosecutor may still employ these alternative means of authentica-
tion.157 These techniques are available even if the prosecutor chooses 
to obtain the documents by granting immunity to the target for his 
act-of-production testimony. A prosecutor may introduce those docu-
ments against the target in a later prosecution if she can show that she 
did not use the target's immunized act of production admissions in 
any way.15s 
Only when a person's possession, knowledge of existence, or belief 
in the authenticity of entity documents is both crucial to the case 
against him and not inf errable from sources other than his own pro-
duction testimony, 159 does the act-of-production privilege become an 
157. See generally Alexander & Alexander, The Authentication of Documents Requirement: 
Barrier to Falsehood or to Truth, 10 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 266 (1973); Levin, Authentication and 
Content of Writings, 10 RUTGERS L. REv. 632, 635-37 (1956). 
158. I=unizing the act-of-production testimony of a target does not prevent the govern-
ment from proving that the target knew the documents existed, possessed them, and thought 
they were the ones named in the subpoena. Use i=unity means only that the government may 
not use the target's testimony from production in its case against him, that it must be able to 
demonstrate that all of its evidence came entirely from independent sources. See Kastigar v. 
United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972); see also Note, Organizational Papers, supra note 8, at 651-52 
(''Kastigar should not present a serious obstacle to the use of immunity for act-of-production 
testimony."); U.S. DEPT. OF JusncE, supra note 133, at 37-38 (use immunity leaves open the 
possibility of prosecuting the witness on basis of independent evidence). But see Heidt, supra 
note 14, at 488 ("Providing use i=unity forces the government to prove the unprovable - that 
it has made no use, evidentiary or otherwise, of the implied admissions compelled.''); Note, Privi-
lege After Fisher and Doe, supra note 8, at 958. 
Another method of obtaining business documents which would not implicate anyone's fifth 
amendment privilege is available to the government in criminal cases - the search warrant. See 
United States v. Fox, 721 F.2d 32, 40 n.6 (2d Cir. 1983) (government could have obtained docu-
ments by search warrant); 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 14, at§ 2259c n.16 (in appropriate cases, 
the government may obtain records by search and seizure). The Court in Andresen v. Maryland, 
427 U.S. 463 (1976), held that a search and seizure does not involve compelled testimonial in-
crimination because in seizing documents on its own, the government does not compel the author 
of the documents to testify. 427 U.S. at 474 (The individual against whom the search is directed 
is not required to aid in the discovery, production, or authentication of incriminating evidence.); 
see also Co=ent, Constitutional Law: Search And Seizure of Private Business Records No 
Longer Supplies Compulsion Necessary to Invoke the Fifth Amendment, 29 U. FLA. L. REV. 376 
(1977) (analyzing Andresen). 
Some suggest the warrant is not a viable alternative to the subpoena because the subpoena is 
the only way to produce documentary evidence when the existence and location of the evidence 
are unknown. See note 105 supra. A subpoena duces tecum, unlike a search warrant, does not 
require the government to demonstrate probable cause that a crime has been committed, nor to 
give a description of the type and location of evidence sought. See United States v. Dionisio, 410 
U.S. 1 (1973); Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 208-09 (1946). Andresen may 
have weakened this objection, however, in holding that a search warrant seeking documents and 
"other fruits, instrumentalities and evidence of crime at this [time] unknown" was valid. 427 
U.S. at 479-82. See also Applegate, The Business Papers Rule: Personal Privacy and White Collar 
Crime, 16 AKRON L. REV. 189, 198 (1982) (Warrants and subpoenas in white collar crime cases 
"cannot be models of particularity and limited discretion.''). 
159. See Note, supra note 66, at 690-91 n.42 (admission of possession is exactly what the 
government hopes to elicit and the defendant fears will be established); notes 161-63 Infra and 
accompanying text; see also Note, Organizational Papers, supra note 8, at 650 n.68 (suggesting a 
type of prosecution in which a target's act-of-production testimony would be critical to the gov-
ernment's case). 
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effective shield against prosecution of that individual. There are two 
reasons why this is not a sufficient basis for limiting the Fisher-Doe 
analysis to individuals and sole proprietors. First, this situation is un-
common.160 Second, and more important, compelling a person's act-
of-production testimony in such a case is clearly inconsistent with the 
fifth amendment. Brown illustrates this well. There, the government 
sought production of corporate records from Brown, the sole target of 
the grand jury's investigation.161 The records subpoenaed involved 
Brown's clients, and neither the grand jury nor the government knew 
if the records existed.162 The government refused to immunize 
Brown's act of production or to permit production by counsel or some 
other third party. The Third Circuit stated that the government 
candidly concedes that what it wants amounts to compelled authentica-
tion testimony which may later be used against a target of the grand jury 
investigation. Such a result would be a convenience to prosecutors .... 
We have no doubt that the repeal of the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion by a constitutional amendment would even be a greater convenience 
to prosecutors, but until that occurs prosecutors must live with the rule 
that no person, even the sole stockholder of a professional corporation, 
may be compelled to disclose the contents of his mind when such disclo-
sure may tend to provide an incriminating link in an evidentiary chain 
for use against bim.163 
If producing corporate records may compel incriminating testimony, 
and if a privilege for that testimony does not shield corporations or 
their agents from law enforcement efforts, then denial of the act-of-
production privilege for persons compelled to produce corporate 
records must ultimately be justified, if at all, by the theory that those 
individuals have no privilege against self-incrimination to assert. 
3. The Waiver Theory 
The final justification for prohibiting a producer of corporate 
records from asserting her act of production privilege is that any per-
son holding corporate records as a corporate representative has waived 
her constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. When a person 
acts as an agent for a corporation, the argument runs, she is not acting 
in her individual capacity, but in a representative capacity that in-
160. See Note, Organizational Papers, supra note 8, at 650. 
161. Brief for Appellant at 4; see also Brown, 768 F.2d at 531 n.6 (Becker, J., concurring) 
(possible that there were other employees of the corporation who could have produced the docu-
ments but "the government insisted on production and authentication of the documents by 
Brown himself ... suggesting that it is the government's strategy to make testimonial use of 
production by Brown"). 
162. Brief for Appellant at 5, Brown. 
163. Brown, 768 F.2d at 529 (citation omitted); see also Gerstein, supra note 74, at 372 ("No 
matter how and why the person may have come into possession of documents, a demand upon 
him for production is still a demand that he personally come forward and take an active part in 
establishing his guilt."). 
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eludes the duty to produce and authenticate corporate records. Be-
cause this duty may involve incriminating oneself, courts have 
reasoned that a corporate agent waives her personal fifth amendment 
right against self-incrimination upon accepting a corporate agency.164 
The Supreme Court suggested this as a rationale in Wilson v. United 
States 165 and United States v. White, 166 two cases that predate the 
Court's holding in Fisher that production admissions may constitute 
testimony. The Court reasoned in White that a person sacrifices cer-
tain fifth amendment rights when he takes a job which may require 
him to produce entity papers: 
[I]ndividuals, when acting as representatives of a collective group, can-
not be said to be exercising their personal rights and duties nor to be 
entitled to their purely personal privileges. Rather they assume the 
rights, duties, and privileges of the artificial entity or association of 
which they are agents or officers and they are bound by its obligations. 
In their official capacity, therefore, they have no privilege against self-
incrimination. 167 
The waiver justification suggested in White does not survive close 
critique or subsequent decisions of the Court. In Curcio v. United 
States, 168 decided thirteen years after White, the Court stated that a 
custodian of entity records does not waive his fifth amendment privi-
164. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Matter (Brown), 768 F.2d 525, 537, 539 (3d Cir. 1985) 
(Garth, J., dissenting); In re Grand Jury Impanelled Jan. 21, 1975 (Freedman), 529 F.2d 543, 
547-48 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 992 (1976) (quoted with approval in In re Grand Jury 
Proceedings (Shilfman), 576 F.2d 703, 707 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 830 (1978)); United 
States v. Austin-Bagley Corp., 31 F.2d 229, 234 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 863 (1929); 
Swagart, The Fifth Amendment Privilege in Corporate Litigation, 7 LlTIGATION, Summer 1981, 
at 22, 23-24; Note, Privilege After Fisher and Doe, supra note 8, at 950-55; Note, Business 
Records and the Fifth Amendment, supra note 14, at 355; see also In re Grand Jury Proceedings 
(Katz), 623 F.2d 122, 128 (2d Cir. 1980) (Lumbard, J., dissenting) ("Those who seek the benefits 
which the laws of our states allow them through the limited liability and the possible tax advan-
tages of the corporate structure should not be heard to complain when a grand jury seeks to 
determine their activities, or the scope of their corporate sheltered activities, by directing its 
inquiries to the one party best qualified to know what has been done publicly and to produce 
such records."); 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 14, at§ 2259c (the waiver theory is strongest with 
custodians of public documents). But see Note, Organizational Papers, supra note 8, at 641 n.7 
(protecting privacy and prosecuting organizational crime are the only two policies that can ex-
plain the inability of individuals to withhold personally incriminating organizational documents). 
165. 221 U.S. 361, 382 (1911) ("[W]here ... books and papers are held subject to examina-
tion by the demanding authority, the custodian has no privilege to refuse production although 
their contents tend to criminate [sic] him. In assuming their custody he has accepted the inci-
dent obligation to permit inspection."). 
166. 322 U.S. 694 (1944). 
167. 322 U.S. at 699 (emphasis added). Similarly, the Court wrote in Bellis v. United States: 
The appellant had no greater right to withhold the books by reason of the fact that the 
corporation was not charged with criminal abuses. That, if the corporation had been so 
charged, he would have been compelled to submit the books to inspection, despite the conse-
quences to himself, sufficiently shows the absence of any basis for a claim on his part of 
personal privilege as to them; it could not depend the question whether or not another was 
accused. 
417 U.S. 85, 98 n.8 (1974) (citing United States v. Wilson, 221 U.S. at 385). 
168. 354 U.S. 118 (1957). 
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lege against being compelled to give oral testimony against himself by 
assuming his agency position. The Court in Curcio expressly rejected 
the government's argument that the duty of a custodian of union 
records includes waiving his privilege against being compelled to tes-
tify against himself. Justice Burton wrote for a unanimous Court: 
A custodian, by assuming the duties of his office, undertakes the obliga-
tion to produce the books of which he is custodian in response to a right-
ful exercise of the State's visitorial powers. But he cannot lawfully be 
compelled, in the absence of a grant of adequate immunity from prosecu-
tion, to condemn himself by his own oral testimony . 
. . . There is no hint in [prior cases including White and Wilson] that 
a custodian of corporate or association books waives his constitutional 
privilege as to oral testimony by assuming the duties of his office . 
. . . [F]orcing the custodian to testify ... requires him to disclose the 
contents of his own mind. He might be compelled to convict himself out 
of his own mouth. That is contrary to the spirit and letter of the Fifth 
Amendment. 169 
Curcio protected only oral testimony, not production admissions. 
Indeed, it is possible to interpret the case as an endorsement of waiver 
of production admissions by entity agents. However, reading Curcio in 
light of Fisher and Doe refutes rather than supports the waiver theory 
for production admissions. Curcio's reasoning shows that an agent, by 
accepting possession of corporate records, does not waive his privilege 
against being compelled to give testimony against himself. Fisher and 
Doe expanded the "testimony" protected by the fifth amendment to 
include production admissions. These two cases granted production 
admissions the same constitutional protection that the Court had pre-
viously extended to oral testimony. This protection includes Curcio's 
rejection of a corporate agent's implied waiver. 
Moreover, the principles underlying the waiver theory are no 
longer persuasive. Courts have traditionally required waiver to "per-
mit inspection" of entity documents by government officials.170 After 
Fisher and Doe, the only privilege against compelled records produc-
tion left to waive is the privilege for the act of production.171 As 
shown above, the act-of-production privilege does not prevent inspec-
tion of corporate records. 172 Consequently, the interest that the Court 
169. Curcio, 354 U.S. at 123-24, 128; see In re Grand Jury Matter (Brown), 768 F.2d 525, 
527 (3d. Cir. 1985) (en bane) (custodian could not be compelled to authenticate records); see also 
In re Grand Jury 83-8 (MIA) Subpoena Duces Tecum, 611 F. Supp. 16, 22-23 (S.D. Fla. 1985) 
(no waiver); Heidt, supra note 70, at 1069-70 (waiver conflicts with rule that an employee can 
invoke the privilege rather than sign interrogatories); White Collar Crime, supra note 68, at 560 
(custodian retains personal privilege). 
170. See Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 382 (1911). 
171. See notes 121-22 supra and accompanying text. 
172. See Part 11.B.2 supra. 
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once balanced against the constitutional privilege - regulation of enti-
ties - is no longer weighty enough to impute a waiver of that 
privilege.173 
In addition, the Court has deemphasized the waiver theory in re-
cent entity decisions. Bellis stressed the need to regulate entities and 
an entity's lack of privacy interests as justifications for compelling en-
tity agents to produce entity records. 174 The waiver rationale has only 
been resurrected by the lower courts to try to explain why their deci-
sions not to protect producers of corporate records are consistent with 
the Fisher and Doe rulings. 
Finally, to impute a "waiver" by corporate agents is unfair as well 
as unnecessary. The idea that a person waives a personal constitu-
tional right by taking a job has little support in decisions concerning 
waiver of other constitutional rights. An employee retains her first 
amendment rights in free speech and in the free exercise of religion; 11s 
her fourth amendment protection against government intrusion into 
areas in which she retains a legitimate expectation of privacy;176 and 
her rights under the fifth and fourteenth amendments to due process 
173. See Note, Testimonial Waiver of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 92 HARV. L. 
REv. 1752, 1761-65 (1979) (rejecting the Court's balancing of the interests underlying the fifth 
amendment privilege against interests in truthfinding in cases not involving testimonial waiver) 
[hereinafter cited as Note, Testimonial Waiver]. But see Note, Privilege After Fisher and Doe, 
supra note 8, at 950 n.117. 
Some courts of appeals have adopted implied waiver as a rationale for rejecting fifth amend· 
ment protection for testimonial admissions implicit in producing those records that fall within 
the required records exception. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Served upon 
Underhill, 781 F.2d 64, 70 (6th Cir. 1986); In re Doe, 711 F.2d 1187, 1191-92 (2d Cir. 1983); In 
re Grand Jury Proceedings (McCoy), 601F.2d162, 171 (5th Cir. 1979); cf. Exotic Coins, Inc. v. 
Beacon, 699 P.2d 930, 949 (Colo.), appeal dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 214 (1985) (state statute's report· 
ing requirements do not violate fifth amendment). The Supreme Court established the required 
records exception to the fifth amendment in Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948). See 
generally Saltzburg, supra note 113. The exception requires that (1) "the purposes of the govern· 
ment's inquiry must be essentially regulatory, rather than criminal"; (2) "the records must con· 
tain the type of information that the regulated party would ordinarily keep"; (3) "the records 
'must have assumed "public aspects" which render them at least analogous to public docu· 
ments.'" Underhill, 781 F.2d at 67 (quoting Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1968)). 
These cases reason that a person carrying on such a regulated activity waives his act-of-produc· 
tion privilege for these documents "as a condition of being able to carry on the regulated activity 
involved.'' 781 F.2d at 70 (quoting McCoy, 601 F.2d at 171). As these decisions involve only 
those records that fall within the narrow required records exception, they are not controlling 
here. But see Note, Privilege After Fisher and Doe, supra note 81 at 952-55 (arguing that courts 
should find that a corporate records producer impliedly waives his privilege against self-incrimi· 
nation for the same reasons that courts imply a waiver in the required records cases). 
174. Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 89, 91-94 (1974). 
175. See, e.g., Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980) (assistant public defender's employment 
could not be terminated because of political party affiliation); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 
(1963) (law refusing unemployment benefits to those who will not work on Saturday violates free 
exercise clause). 
176. See Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312 (1978) ("The businessman, like the 
occupant of a residence, has a constitutional right to go about his business free from unreasona· 
ble official entries upon his private commercial property.'') (quoting See v. City of Seattle, 387 
U.S. 541, 543 (1967)). 
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and equal prot~ction. 177 Normally, waiver of a constitutional right is 
effective only if the person who allegedly makes it does so knowingly 
and voluntarily. 178 The imputed waiver for corporate employees is 
particularly unknowing and involuntary. Arguably, corporate officers 
and custodians of corporate records may have reason to know that 
they could be required by authorities to produce and identify the 
records of the corporation, but the average employee certainly does 
not know that she is waiving her privilege against self-incrimination by 
accepting employment with a corporation.179 
The "waiver" implied from employment can be distinguished from 
inadvertent waivers of the privilege against self-incrimination sus-
tained by the Supreme Court in other circumstances. The Court has 
recognized a waiver only after a person has somehow revealed infor-
mation that the privilege entitled her to conceal.180 In contrast, sim-
177. See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (state employee has due process 
right to termination hearing). 
178. E.g., Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 276 (1968) (waiver of privilege to refuse to 
respond to self-incriminatory questions must be knowing and voluntary); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 
U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (stating that a "waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or aban-
donment of a known right or privilege"). 
179. Entity representatives subject to subpoena to produce an entity's records include secre-
taries, clerks, tellers, cashiers, and other employees or members who do not expect to assume 
personally the entity's responsibility for producing its records. One commentator has noted: 
Given the ever increasing number of persons employed by corporations and other forms of 
organized business entities, the ruling [in White] significantly curtails the fifth amendment 
rights of a large portion of the populace. Moreover, the impact of the decision on the lives 
of these people is quite pervasive because business affairs constitute the bulk of their daily 
activities. 
Cramer, supra note 19, at 373 n.37; see also Municipal Investigating Comm. v. Servello, 200 N.J. 
Super. 413, 422, 491 A.2d 779, 783 (1984) (''The rightful interest of the [investigating committee] 
in uncovering corruption in its police department cannot prevail against the constitutional rights 
guaranteed to all our citizens, including police officers. In swearing to uphold and defend the 
U.S. Constitution, a police officer does not thereby lose his protection."); Note, Testimonial 
Waiver, supra note 173, at 1765-66: 
[W]hen the events which directly implicate the right (le., require the right to be asserted to 
prevent the immediate loss of some protection afforded by the right) do not occur simultane-
ously with acts which constitute a relinquishment of the right, we cannot conclude that such 
a relinquishment is voluntary unless ... , at the time of waiver, ... the witness [knows] of 
the possible consequences of the conduct which creates the waiver. 
Cf. Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 279 (1968) (mandate of constitutional privilege does not 
tolerate an attempt to coerce a waiver on penalty ofloss of employment); Garrity v. New Jersey, 
385 U.S. 493, 497 (1967) ("The option to lose their means of livelihood orcto pay the penalty of 
self-incrimination is the antithesis of free choice to speak out or remain silent."). 
180. A witness may not invoke her privilege against self-incrimination as to details after she 
has inadvertently disclosed incriminating facts. Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 374 
(1951). Waiver of the privilege to resist answering additional questions relating to a particular 
subject matter occurs when a witness "opens the door" by answering a question about that sub-
ject. See Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 157 (1958); Comment, Waiver of the Fifth: What 
Level of Incrimination?, 26 Sw. L.J. 589, 595-96 (1972). See generally Note, Testimonial Waiver, 
supra note 173. 
Inadvertent waiver of the privilege for testimony implicit in the act of production, for in-
stance, may result when a person who has received a subpoena duces tecum shows up with the 
subpoenaed papers in her hand and then refuses to identify them from the witness stand. By the 
time she attempts to assert her privilege, the admissions that may have been privileged have 
already been made. See United States v. Penrod, 609 F.2d 1092, 1095 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. 
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ply accepting employment, appointment, transfer, or promotion to a 
job where one might be.asked to produce records is very unlike dis-
closing something one had a constitutional right not to reveal. 181 In-
deed, when the entity is an association without officers, such as a 
political organization whose only representatives are members,182 the 
waiver theory essentially requires a member to give up one constitu-
tional right - her freedom to associate and become a member - for 
another - her privilege not to be compelled by the government to 
incriminate herself. 
CONCLUSION 
Applying Fisher and Doe to corporate records does not undermine 
the vitality of the entity rule's distinction between fifth amendment 
protection for individuals and fifth amendment protection for entities. 
Rather, application of the act-of-production privilege to corporate 
records producers rests on the principles of the entity doctrine. By 
requiring entities to obey court orders to produce documents, even if 
compliance means appointing an agent to produce and authenticate 
those documents, the entity rule of Bellis assures that a corporate 
agent cannot shield contents of corporate documents with her personal 
fifth amendment privilege. Under Doe's foregone conclusion test, 
courts will not recognize the self-incrimination claims of most agents 
ordered to produce entity documents. Authorities may still investigate 
and prosecute those agents whose self-incrimination claims are suc-
cessful under Doe by using alternative means of production and au-
thentication or a limited grant of immunity. Despite the absence of 
any substantial increase in actual protection for potential targets, ap-
plying Doe to incriminating production admissions, regardless of the 
nature of the documents produced, logically extends to all persons 
equally what is left of fifth amendment protection for document pro-
ducers after Doe. 
- Nancy J. King 
denied, 106 S. Ct. 1188 (1986); United States v. Kretz Equip. Co., 56 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 85-5135 
(N.D. Ind. 1985) ("By producing the sealed boxes respondents admitted that that [sic] docu-
ments existed, that they possessed them, and that the papers were those described in petitioner's 
summons. Thus ... respondents waived their privilege of self-incrimination as to testimonial 
conduct indicating the existence and control of the documents."); see also Cramer, supra note 19, 
at 398 n.161. 
181. See Note, Books and Records Privilege, supra note 14, at 100. The author argued: 
[T]o demand a waiver of the privilege in return for the right to earn a living , , • would 
appear to be unconstitutional. ... A valid waiver would have to be based on a valid election, 
actually exercised. However, any election which offers as alternatives, loss of one's constitu-
tional privilege or loss of livelihood is purely theoretical and is a transparent excuse for the 
deprivation of individual rights. 
182. See notes 24 & 28 supra and accompanying text. 
